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Abstract—System specifications have long been expressed
through automata-based languages, which allow for composi-
tional construction of complex models and enable automated
verification techniques such as model checking. Automata-based
verification has been extensively used in the analysis of systems,
where they are able to provide yes/no answers to queries
regarding their temporal properties. Probabilistic modelling and
checking aim at enriching this binary, qualitative information
with quantitative information, more suitable to approaches such
as reliability engineering.
Compositional construction of software specifications reduces
the specification effort, allowing the engineer to focus on spec-
ifying individual component behaviour to then analyse the
composite system behaviour. Compositional construction also
reduces the validation effort, since the validity of the com-
posite specification should be dependent on the validity of the
components. These component models are smaller and thus
easier to validate. Compositional construction poses additional
challenges in a probabilistic setting. Numerical annotations of
probabilistically independent events must be contrasted against
estimations or measurements, taking care of not compound-
ing this quantification with exogenous factors, in particular
the behaviour of other system components. Thus, the validity
of compositionally constructed system specifications requires
that the validated probabilistic behaviour of each component
continues to be preserved in the composite system. However,
existing probabilistic automata-based formalisms do not support
specification of non-deterministic and probabilistic component
behaviour which, when observed through logics such as pCTL,
is preserved in the composite system.
In this paper we present a probabilistic extension to Interface
Automata which preserves pCTL properties under probabilis-
tic fairness by ensuring a probabilistic branching simulation
between component and composite automata. The extension
not only supports probabilistic behaviour but also allows for
weaker prerequisites to interfacing composition, that supports
delayed synchronisation that may be required because of internal
component behaviour. These results are equally applicable as an
extension to non-probabilistic Interface Automata.
Index Terms—Behaviour models, probability, Interface Au-
tomata, model checking
I. INTRODUCTION
MODELLING languages are envisioned with the objec-tive of capturing and conveying relevant aspects of
a system design, many times resorting to diverse languages
to describe separate aspects of the system. In the realm of
software engineering in particular, many such languages have
been introduced into general use, including automata-based
languages which have the advantage of being simple enough
to be used as a means to exhibit design and documentation,
but also formal enough to be used as artefacts amenable to
automated validation and verification.
Techniques that automatically explore automata-based mod-
els in order to gain increased assurance regarding the absence
of errors have been investigated for some time. A notable
example is model checking [1] where an exhaustive search
of the model yields, in its most basic and widespread form, a
yes/no response to the question of whether the model satisfies
a specific property.
Although obtaining binary results from model checkers has
been shown to be useful for validation and verification, when
the model checker returns a negative answer this can represent
insufficient information. This is acknowledged, for instance, in
the software reliability community where the interest is not in
whether certain properties hold, for example because they are
known to be unavoidable (e.g., failures due to uncontrollable
network transmissions), impractical to fix (e.g., hardware-
based failures on deployed satellites, or similarly inaccessible
systems), or simply because fixing them is uneconomical (e.g.,
mass product recalls). Alternatively, the focus is on measuring
the likelihood of the properties being violated.
Compositional automata-based model construction allows
building complex models by specifying the behaviour of
system components, and then computing automatically the
behaviour of the system resulting from having components
execute concurrently and synchronising over their public in-
terfaces. Compositionality allows structuring the specification
similarly to how complex systems are built and greatly sim-
plifies the specification effort
In theory, compositional construction also reduces the val-
idation effort as the validity of the composite specification
should be dependent on the validity of the components, which
are smaller and thus easier to validate. However, this requires
the models to fulfil two fundamental conditions. Firstly, it must
be possible to isolate the behaviour of a component in such a
way that its behaviour can be described independently of the
environment it may execute in. Secondly, a composition opera-
tion is required that can guarantee to preserve in the composite
system the independent behaviour of each component.
In constructing probabilistic automata compositionally,
measuring the likelihood of a component making a choice
independently of the behaviour of its environment can be no-
toriously difficult [2]. Doing so may require careful decompo-
sition of probabilities that were estimated or measured from an
existing composite system’s execution log. These compound
probabilities need to be decomposed into conditional ones,
that can be incorporated into a component description that
will form part of a new composite system that is expected to
replace the system used for measurement. For instance, the
likelihood of a user selecting coffee in a vending machine
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must be extracted conditionally from the different available
choices the user may have had at the moment of selecting the
beverage.
Having specified and validated probabilistic behaviour
component-wise, the expectation is that the probabilistic prop-
erties that are guaranteed by the numerical annotations of prob-
abilistically independent events in the component descriptions
continue to be preserved over the composite system. For ex-
ample, a vending machine user’s overall likelihood of selecting
coffee, independently of the system it is interacting with, is
guaranteed to be between 0 and max; where 0 represents the
worst case in which the vending machine never offers coffee,
while max is the maximum likelihood of choosing coffee
for some combination of offered drinks. The expectation is
that, no matter what vending machine is used, the system
level probability of coffee being selected will continue to be
between 0 and max, as this range of probabilities is dependent
on the user behaviour alone.
Although many variations of probabilistic automata (e.g.
[3], [4], [5], [6]) and composition operators (see [7] for a sur-
vey) have been proposed, none of these support specification
of non-deterministic and probabilistic component behaviour
which, when observed through appropriate logics, is preserved
in the composite system. The problems they exhibit can be
characterised as a lack of an appropriate treatment of the no-
tion of action controllability in combination with probabilistic
descriptions. This leads to a number of problems including
i) unclear semantics of the probabilities of the environment
model, ii) unintuitive probability distributions in the composite
model, and as a consequence iii) a lack of preservation of
components’ probabilistic properties over the composition [6],
[8]. These shortcomings work against the goal of being able
to reason about separate components, and have an assurance
that the individually validated behaviours still hold once the
composite system is built.
In this paper we propose a novel formalism for reason-
ing quantitatively in such a way that individual component
behaviour is guaranteed to be preserved over a composition.
This approach achieves the goal by combining, and adding to,
notions taken from Input-Output Probabilistic Automata [3]
and Interface Automata [9]. Thus, the main contribution of the
paper is a formalism that supports compositional construction
and validation of probabilistic models. We establish the cor-
rectness of our approach by showing that parallel composition
of our models is such that it preserves a weak probabilistic
simulation [10], thus preserving the desired behaviour over
the composite system.
A second contribution of this paper is that we weaken
the constraints imposed by Interface Automata to specify
when two automata may be composed. Interface Automata
requires a component to be able to accept environmental
inputs immediately, disallowing internal computation even
if the component is guaranteed to always allow the input
at the end of such internal computation. In this paper, we
propose a delayed synchronisation mechanism that relaxes the
Interface Automata composition precondition and allows for
richer modelling of internal computation.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in
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Fig. 1: A simple coffee machine.
section II we use an example to motivate our approach,
comparing to existing ones. In section III we present some
building blocks for our work, while in section IV we present
our novel approach to the problem of probabilistic component-
based verification. In section IV-B we show the main results
of the paper; that is, composition over this new formalism
is correct in terms of the semantics intended and property
preservation. Along the paper, we illustrate our ideas with a
motivating example and expand the ideas on a case study in
section V. Finally, we discuss the relation of our work with
previous efforts in section VI and offer our conclusions and
prospects of future work on the subject.
II. MOTIVATION
In this section we present a simple example to motivate
the problem of compositional construction and analysis of
probabilistic models. We also highlight the main issues related
to the modelling of non-determinism and probabilities that
threaten the compositional construction approach.
We first discuss the model for the machine presented in
Figure 1. This coffee machine has a digital tactile screen with
which it interacts with the user, showing the user various
options at different times during operation. First, the coffee
machine offers the user, through the screen, a beverage choice
between either an espresso or a latte. Once the user chooses
her selection, the machine clears its screen and possibly shows
a message telling the user to wait for beverage preparation.
At this point, in a way unknown to the user, the machine
prepares the beverage. Then, the machine informs the user
it has finished the preparation. Now, the screen prompts for
the addition of sugar or sweetener, and finally delivers the
prepared drink when the choice is made. However, this coffee
machine is known to sometimes overheat, requiring manual
drainage. We have some information about the conditions
under which the machine overheats, so we add this information
to the model.
Without the need of having a model of the user, we can
already validate some behaviour on this coffee machine model.
For example, we may be interested in knowing whether the
machine can overheat after it has added coffee to the cup, as
at this point the coffee may boil and spill violently towards
the user, posing a safety hazard. By observing the trace that
traverses states 0, 2, 5, 6, 8, 3, we see that such an error is
clearly possible. Moreover, note that there is always at least
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a 0.05 chance that this behaviour will manifest independently
of user choices. It could be even worse if the machine always
overheats at state 4, but we do not have the probabilistic
information to quantify this claim. All we know is that the
likelihood of the unsafe behaviour lies between 0.05 and 1.
For the sake of argument, assume for a moment that it
is uneconomical to fix this behaviour unless the likelihood
of it surpasses some probability threshold poverheat > 0.05.
Once we have the user model and compose it with our coffee
machine, we could answer whether this threshold is met or
not. For example, if the user were such that she never orders
a latte, then the probability of overheating is exactly 0.05 and
therefore there is no need for a fix. However, if she does order
lattes, then it could overheat every time this happens.
In other words, we are interested in quantifying the occur-
rence of this error based on the expected behaviour of the
environment interacting with the coffee machine.
In order to achieve this objective, we set out to produce a
probabilistic model of the user’s behaviour. However, not every
modelling formalism will suit our compositional construction
approach. Some choices may lead to problems which may not
be immediately obvious, and these may arise from both the
probabilistic aspect of the modelling and the non-deterministic
as well.
A. Issues arising from probabilistic modelling
There exist two main approaches for modelling probabilities
over transitions of a behaviour model; namely modelling them
via a generative [4] approach or a reactive [5] one.
Generative models are characterised by having a transition
relation that defines, for each source state, a distribution on
the cartesian product of the set of states and actions. That is,
for each transition, both an action and a destination state are
probabilistically selected. This choice of distributions leads
to some well-known problems when trying to compose a
generative model with another [6].
First, the generative paradigm forces all transitions to be
probabilistically annotated. This is true even in the case of
states that may transition because of both input and output
actions. Probabilistically quantifying such choices would en-
code the probabilities of the resolution of this race between
actions, an aspect that is usually outside the control of either
component. A second problem arises if a component specifies
a certain probability for an output action that is not accepted,
or an input action that may never be received. In such a case,
the probability of that action being triggered is obviously zero
in the composition, yet the component specified a non-zero
probability. This contradiction needs to be resolved at compo-
sition time. Although some solutions have been proposed to
redistribute this missing probability [6], they are all arbitrary
in that they need to guess what the component would have
done if the action were not present.
These problems can be explained technically in terms
of a lack that generative models have in modelling non-
determinism, and a lack of clear semantics for the concurrent
composition in such cases. Not allowing non-determinism
means that these models are at a loss when it comes to mod-
elling external actions the environment must act in response
to.
Alternatively, the environment can be modelled under the
reactive paradigm [5], under which each action on each
state has a probabilistic distribution that defines the next
state. Under the reactive paradigm, the action at each state
is chosen in a non-probabilistic fashion (even allowing for
non-determinism between different distributions for a same
action), and only then the destination state is determined
probabilistically. Reactive models, contrary to their generative
counterpart, do allow for non-determinism, but do not allow
probabilistic choice between different actions. There is a
workaround for this, however, using hidden internal actions.
State 6 in the coffee machine model of Figure 1 shows an
example of this workaround.
The use of a reactive probabilistic model solves many of
the issues of the generative paradigm. However, in general,
reactive probabilistic models allow for behaviour that does not
necessarily consider input/output restrictions between compo-
nents. Recall the property that the machine may overheat after
dispensing coffee. We have already seen that this property
holds with probability at least 0.05 for our modelled system.
Yet, we can model a user environment that chooses to never
synchronise on the overheat action, effectively blocking it.
Oddly, the result obtained using standard composition [5] and
analysis [11] is that the probability of the composite system
overheating in an unsafe way is now zero, which means the
error has probability 0 which is below the lower bound to error
(0.05) that we had established when validating the machine
model in isolation. The reason for such an unintuitive result is
that the environment constrains the occurrence of a transition
that should be controlled by the coffee machine.
The result in the previous analysis is quite unintuitive. There
is a property that holds for the machine, and that does not
depend on the environment to hold; but when composed with
a certain environment it does not hold any more. Such a con-
tradiction indicates that something is wrong with the way we
have modelled either the system or the environment; in the way
we composed them together, or in the probability computation.
Again, this lack of behaviour preservation makes our goal of
performing early probabilistic validation impossible.
It is important to note that, contrary to the case of gener-
ative modelling, these problems do not relate strictly to the
probabilistic annotations. Rather, they arise as a consequence
of the inappropriate treatment of the notion of controllability.
However, they do have an impact in terms of preservation
of component properties. As such, we will make use of
reactive modelling for the introduction of probabilities into
the environment, but will need to resolve the synchronisation
issues to ensure that components cannot restrict what other
components are intended to control.
B. Issues arising from action controllability
Most of the aforementioned synchronisation semantics
problems have been tackled by introducing a semantic dis-
tinction between input, output and internal (also called hidden)
actions. These sets of actions represent those that the compo-
nent can listen to (in the case of input actions) and emit (in the
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Fig. 2: Input/Output models for the simple coffee machine
case of output actions). The set of internal actions represents
those that cannot be observed from outside the component,
and do not take part of the interface of the component. The
most well-know approaches to modelling that take this action
segregation idea are those of Input/Output Automata [12] and
Interface Automata [9]. Input/Output automata require that
each component is input-enabled, that is, that they accept every
possible input at every state. Interface Automata relaxes this
condition a little by only enforcing that input synchronisations
are always possible, but do not force an input to be enabled
at a given state if it is known that it will not be triggered at
that state.
Input enabledness introduces two modelling problems. First,
it clutters models with unnecessary transitions. For example,
we can look at the models in Figures 2a and 2b. In this
figure, the Input/Output automaton 2a models a coffee ma-
chine somewhat simpler to the one discussed above, while
Input/Output automaton 2b models a potential environment
that will interact with the coffee machine. It is noteworthy
that the requirement for input enabledness does make the
modelling more cumbersome.
The second problem is that input-enabledness restrictions
are unrealistic for modelling some systems. It is usually the
case that a component will accept some inputs in one state,
while it will accept a different set of inputs in another. In
fact, it may not accept any inputs at all until it finishes some
internal computation, at which point it will accept new inputs.
The need for immediate synchronisation with intended output
actions hampers an iterative refinement approach where this
internal behaviour is gradually modelled. As an example of
how this problem arises, refer back to Figures 2a and 2b. An
engineer may now decide that the level of abstraction used to
depict the behaviour of the coffee machine is too high, and
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Fig. 3: Approaches to refinement of the coffee machine model
she may decide to model some of the internal behaviour of
the component. In particular, the engineer decides it would be
interesting to note that the machine needs to heat the water
for the beverages prior to preparing them. The result of this
decision is a new model depicted in Figure 3a. However, this
new model is now not an Input/Output automaton respective
to the environment model, as the grey state is blocking inputs
from the environment that, at this point, may choose the
beverage, and later choose whether to add sugar or not.
In order to turn this model into a valid Input/Output au-
tomaton it becomes necessary to take into account that the
environment model expects a single push of the espresso
button to prepare the drink, and a second one for the sweetener
choice. Simply adding loops and ignoring the environment
espresso, sugar and nosugar actions is insufficient,
as the environment would now be expecting the beverage to
be dispensed, and such an action would never happen. The
model depicted by the automaton shown in Figure 3b fulfils
both this requirement and Input/Output synchronisation. It is
easy to see that it is overly complex because of this need to
remember user choices that may have happened during the
internal actions of the machine. This complexity arises even
for the very simple behaviour exhibited for this machine. Of
course, an alternative modelling could consider signalling the
environment that although the input actions are enabled, they
are being ignored. However, such a decision involves a rework
on the environment itself. Worse, such changes are a result of
trying to fit a methodology rather than an attempt at modelling
the actual interaction.
1) Interface Automata: Interface Automata [9] have been
proposed as an alternative formalism, but one that still retains
the notion of segregating interfacing actions. The Interface
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Automata formalism stipulates that the composition of a pair
of components will be legal only if components do not block
each other, that is, if every time that one component intends to
exercise one of its output actions, the other component enables
such action (as part of its own input actions). In this case, it
is not necessary to spuriously enable input actions, as only
those that are actually needed are mandatory to be enabled.
In this sense, Interface Automata allow for succinct modelling
of interfacing protocols than their Input/Output counterpart,
which assumes input-enabledness. However, similarly to In-
put/Output automata, they do require that the non-blocking
behaviour be immediate, that is, whenever a component wants
to emit one of its output actions, the corresponding input action
must be immediately enabled at its counterpart component.
Except for the immediacy restrictions depicted above, In-
terface Automata seem to be a natural choice for modelling
synchronisation and controllability. From an engineering point
of view, it is natural to model the restriction of certain actions
at selected states as long as these restrictions are compatible
with the behaviour of the component that controls them.
In this way, assumptions about the behaviour of cooperating
models can be encoded directly, easing the task of mod-
elling interactions such as protocols enforcing ordered method
calls, internal uninterruptible behaviour or system exceptions,
among other useful system properties. This results in more
concise models, as the engineer is released from the obligation
of having to explicitly model responses for interactions that are
known to not occur in the reality being modelled.
It is important to note, however, that specifying a sim-
ilar formalism to the one we will present, but using In-
put/Output automata-like modelling is feasible. The choice
of Input/Output Automata over Interface Automata is of no
consequence regarding the solutions to the problems described
in the previous sections, and the way to resolve them would
be similar in both cases.
Regarding the immediate enabledness requirements dis-
cussed above, a formalism that allows for modelling such
delayed synchronisation is thus desirable. Of course, an impor-
tant requirement for such a model is that it can be guaranteed
that for every possible future behaviour, the synchronisation
point will always be available. Such guarantees will require
some restrictions on unfair behaviour of the system under
analysis that may hamper such guarantees. We will study
these guarantees when we present our modelling formalism
in Section IV.
C. Combining probabilities modelling and synchronisation
semantics
Summarising the previous paragraphs, in order to model
the probabilistic behaviour of the environment and compose
it with a non-probabilistic behaviour model of the system to
obtain meaningful quantitative results, a formalism is needed
that can i) allow for modelling of both non-deterministic
behaviour and probabilistic behaviour, ii) address notions
of controllability and monitorability of actions by the envi-
ronment and system (including synchronisation notions and
delayed behaviour), and iii) preserve probabilistic properties
of the environment after composition.
In the following sections we propose a formalism which dis-
tinguishes output/controlled and input/monitored actions, and
also supports probabilistic and non-deterministic behaviour.
Our formalism is inspired on probabilistic reactive models for
introducing probabilities, as we discussed above. Synchroni-
sation will be modelled inspired on Interface Automata. This
combination allows for satisfying objective i) in the above
paragraph, as well as ii).
However, challenges arise from the combination of these
two formalisms. The previous discussion hints at some of
these challenges, and we elaborate on our solution on the next
sections. We focus especially on the mechanisms that allow
us to ensure that iii) is satisfied.
We will also tackle the problem of the need for immediate
synchronisation.To this end, we will introduce a notion of
fairness for executions of these automata that allows us to
distinguish those cases where future synchronisation of de-
layed actions is guaranteed from those where it is not. Further,
we will also present a suitable composition operator for these
automata and in Theorem IV.1 we demonstrate the required
results of property preservation.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section we present some building blocks for our
work. We will recall Interface Automata and related notions,
as well as the base probabilistic model in which our new
formalism is based.
We will also make use of various concepts related to
measure and probability theory when referring to probabilistic
models and its characteristics. Although various concepts will
be summarily introduced, the interested reader is referred
to [13] for in-depth discussion. We will also introduce some
other concepts relating to probabilistic automata theory as the
need arises.
A. Interface Automata notions
1) Model and executions:
Definition III.1 (Interface Automata [9]). An Interface Au-
tomaton is a tuple P =< SP , s0P , A
I
P , A
O
P , A
H
P , RP > where:
• SP is a finite set of states.
• s0P ∈ SP is a distinct initial state.
• AIP , A
O
P , A
H
P are finite and mutually disjoint sets of input,
output and hidden actions respectively. We denote the set
of all actions AP = AIP ∪AOP ∪AHP .
• RP ⊆ SP ×AP × SP is the transition relation.
We will write AIP (s), A
O
P (s) and A
H
P (s) for a state s ∈
SP to denote the subset of actions in AIP , A
O
P and A
H
P ,
respectively, that are enabled at s. An action a ∈ AP is
said to be enabled at state s ∈ SP if there exists t ∈ SP
such that (s, a, t) ∈ RP . Alternatively, we may say that the
transition (s, a, t) itself is enabled if the previous condition
holds. Analogously, we denote AP (s) the subset of actions
enabled at state s, regardless of them being input, output or
hidden actions. Without loss of generality, we require that for
each state s ∈ SP , there exists s′ ∈ SP , a ∈ AP such that
(s, a, s′) ∈ RP .
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In essence, an Interface Automaton is a labelled transition
system (LTS) [14] where its action set has been further
subdivided to distinguish the input, output and hidden actions.
As we will see, this does not make a syntactic difference, but it
does semantically. Also, note that we have reduced the original
set of initial states to a single one without loss of generality.
Definition III.2 (Execution fragment and executions). An
execution fragment of an Interface Automaton P is a (possibly
infinite) sequence α = s0a1s1a2s2 . . . of alternating states
and action labels. Execution fragments always start with a
state and, if finite, also end with a state. Each subsequence
siai+1si+1 within an execution fragment of P is such that
(si, ai+1, si+1) ∈ RP .
Given an execution fragment α, first(α) denotes the first
state of the fragment, while tail(α) denote the execution
fragment from its second state. tail(α) might be empty if α
is finite and consists of only one state. If α is finite, last(α)
denotes its final state.
An execution of an Interface Automaton P is an execution
fragment α of P such that first(α) = s0P , the initial state of
P . As executions are execution fragments themselves, they can
also be finite or infinite.
We will also note fragments(P ) and fragments∗(P ) to
denote the set of execution fragments of P and the set of
finite execution fragments of P , respectively. Accordingly, we
will note execs(P ) and execs∗(P ) for the set of executions
and finite executions of P . For convenience, we also define
length : fragments(P ) → N ∪ ∞ to be the number of
states traversed by the execution fragment. Finally, we define
projectors αsi and α
a
i that return the i-th state and i-th
transition label respectively. Note that αsi is defined from 0
through length(α) − 1, while αai is defined from 1 through
length(α) − 1. Finally, we will note α ≤ α′ to indicate that
the execution fragment α is a prefix of execution fragment
α′; that is, for each 0 ≤ i ≤ length(α) − 1, αsi = α′si and
for each 1 ≤ j ≤ length(α) − 1, αaj = α′aj . Accordingly,
suffix (α, i) is defined for every i < length(α) and obtains
the execution fragment that results of dropping the first i states
and actions from an execution fragment. Therefore, for an ex-
ecution fragment α = s0a1s1a2s2a3s3 . . ., suffix (α, 0) = α,
suffix (α, 1) = s1a2s2a3s3 . . . and so on.
2) Parallel composition: The notion of action segregation
in Interface Automata allows for the notion of composability
of Interface Automata:
Definition III.3 (Composability [9]). Let P and Q be two
Interface Automata. We say P and Q are composable if it
holds simultaneously that AHP ∩ AQ = ∅, AP ∩ AHQ = ∅,
AIP ∩AIQ = ∅, and AOP ∩AOQ = ∅.
Furthermore, when referring to the interaction of two Inter-
face Automata P and Q, it is usual to allude to its shared set of
actions, Shared(P,Q) = AP ∩AQ. Note that if P and Q are
composable, then Shared(P,Q) = (AIP ∩AOQ) ∪ (AOP ∩AIQ).
We recall the definition of Interface Automata product and
illegal states.
Definition III.4 (Product [9]). Let P and Q be two com-
posable Interface Automata. Their product P ⊗Q is another
Interface Automaton defined by states SP⊗Q = SP × SQ;
initial state s0P⊗Q = (s
0
P , s
0
Q); action sets A
I
P⊗Q = (A
I
P ∪
AIQ) \ Shared(P,Q); AOP⊗Q = (AOP ∪ AOQ) \ Shared(P,Q)
and AHP⊗Q = A
H
P ∪AHQ ∪Shared(P,Q). Its transition relation
RP⊗Q is defined by the set
{((s, t), a, (s′, t)) such that (s, a, s′) ∈ RP∧
t ∈ SQ ∧ a /∈ Shared(P,Q)}∪
{((s, t), a, (s, t′)) such that (t, a, t′) ∈ RQ∧
s ∈ SP ∧ a /∈ Shared(P,Q)}∪
{((s, t), a, (s′, t′)) such that a ∈ Shared(P,Q)∧
(s, a, s′) ∈ RP ∧ (t, a, t′) ∈ RQ}

Since the behaviour of a composite Interface Automaton is
directly related to the behaviour of each of its components,
there is a close relationship between the executions (and
executions fragments) of a composite system, and those of its
components. However, this depends on the semantics of the
interface. The action segregation introduced in the definition of
Interface Automata is essentially a description language tool.
Although it has no bearing in the previous formal definitions, it
introduces the notion of illegal composition states. Intuitively,
a composition state will be regarded as illegal if, somehow,
it violates the enabledness of the intended actions of each
component.
Definition III.5 (Illegal states [9]). Given two composable
Interface Automata P and Q, their product’s illegal states are
defined by the set Illegal(P,Q) ⊆ SP ×SQ. For any s ∈ SP ,
q ∈ SQ, (s, q) ∈ Illegal(P,Q) if ∃a ∈ Shared(P,Q) such that
a ∈ AOP (s) ∧ a /∈ AIQ(q), or conversely ∃a ∈ Shared(P,Q)
such that a /∈ AIP (s) ∧ a ∈ AOQ(q).
Informally, the idea behind illegal states is that, for a
composition to be legal, component systems should not be
able to block each other’s enabled output actions. We will
abuse notation and say that the product P⊗Q of two Interface
Automata P and Q is legal if the product has no reachable
illegal states.
The notions of composability and illegal states make it
possible to define what a valid environment for a given
Interface Automaton is.
Definition III.6 (Valid environment [9]). Given a non-empty
Interface Automaton P (that is, P has at least one state),
another Interface Automaton Q is a valid environment for
P if all the following hold: i) P and Q are composable; ii)
AIQ = A
O
P ; iii) no state in Illegal(P,Q) is reachable in P⊗Q;
and iv) P ⊗Q is non-empty as well.
3) Non-determinism and schedulers: Finally, it is important
to note that the distinct execution fragments generated by
an Interface Automata depend on how the choice between
different transitions is resolved. That is, whenever two or more
actions can be chosen in a state, the choice of which action to
take is left unspecified, and can only be resolved by an external
agent. In order to distinguish this choice from the probabilistic
choices that will appear later in the paper, we will refer to these
choices as non-deterministic choices. Note that this is slightly
different from a common meaning of non-determinism which
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is limited to the choice between different transitions with the
same label. In this paper we refer to non-deterministic choices
to those that are not probabilistic in nature.
In order to characterise this external agent, and thus the dif-
ferent non-deterministic choices and the execution fragments
that they induce, we will introduce the notion of a scheduler.
Definition III.7 (Scheduler). A scheduler σ for an Inter-
face Automaton P =< SP , s0P , AP , RP > (also called an
adversary) is a total function σ : execs∗(P ) → RP , such
that σ(α) is a transition starting from last(α); and whenever
σ(α) = (last(α), a, s) it must be that (last(α), a, s) ∈ RP .
The notation Sched(P ) refers to the set of all possible sched-
ulers for the automaton P ; while σ(α)a and σ(α)s refer to
the scheduled action and destination state given an execution
α, respectively.
The idea behind schedulers is that they drive the execution
of the automaton by resolving all possible non-determinism.
As such, they restrict the set of possible execution fragments.
Extending this notion, a set of schedulers defines a set of
possible executions and execution fragments.
Definition III.8 (Scheduler-generated executions). Given an
Interface Automaton P , a scheduler σP and an execution α ∈
execs(P ), we say that σP generates α over P if and only if
for each 0 ≤ i < length(α) it holds that σP (αs0αa1 . . . αsi ) =
(αsi , α
a
i+1, α
s
i+1).
Note that once a scheduler σ is set for an Interface Automa-
ton P , this scheduler eliminates all possible branching. That
is, it generates a single infinite execution fragment, along with
its infinite set of finite prefixes.
Some schedulers will not be very useful to our approach,
as they may model invalid behaviours. In particular, we are
interested in schedulers that are fair in their choices of
non-determinism resolution, as they have desirable properties
which will be discussed later. The following definitions deal
with our requirements for fairness, which have been adapted
from [15], [16], [17].
Definition III.9 (Fair executions). Let α be an infinite ex-
ecution over an Interface Automaton P . For each s ∈ SP ,
let Traversals(α, s) = {i ∈ N0 · αsi = s}, that is
Traversals(α, s) denotes the indexes in α where state s is
traversed. Similarly, define Traversals(α, (s, a, s′)) to be the
indexes in α where the transition (s, a, s′) is taken.
We say that α is a fair execution if for each s ∈ SP such
that Traversals(α, s) is an infinite set it holds that whenever
(s, a, s′) is an enabled transition from s (that is, (s, a, s′) ∈
RP ), then the set Traversals(α, (s, a, s′)) is also infinite.
Informally, an execution is fair if, every time that it passes
through a state t infinitely often, then it also progresses over
each of its enabled transitions infinitely often. In other words,
whenever a transition is enabled and the execution has the
opportunity to take it, a fair execution cannot indefinitely avoid
taking it. We will extend this notion of fairness to schedulers.
Definition III.10 (Strictly fair schedulers [1]). A scheduler σ
is strictly fair (also called strong fair) if the infinite execution
it generates is itself fair.
The reasons behind the choice of words on defining sched-
ulers as strictly fair in Definition III.10 will be made more
clear once we examine schedulers for probabilistic models.
4) Logics for property description: Several temporal logics
have been put forth for reasoning about the protocols described
by automata-like formalisms. As we will see later when
we discuss property preservation, we need to preserve the
branching structure of components within the composition. We
will therefore express these behaviour properties with the logic
CTL (Computational Tree Logic) [18], or some variants of it.
ACTL [19] (not to be confused with the universal fragment of
CTL) in particular is a temporal logic equivalent to CTL. The
main difference is that, while CTL focuses its predicates on
states, ACTL does so on the set of actions. ACTL will become
useful to us, as it allows us to express directly the restrictions
that pertain to the availability of actions for synchronisation,
which will allow us to expand the notion of composability in
Section IV.
Definition III.11 (ACTL Syntax [19]). The set of ACTL
formulae is defined as the smallest set of state formulae such
that
• True is a state formula;
• if φ1 and φ2 are state formulae, then ¬φ1 and φ1 ∧ φ2
are also state formulae;
• if ψ is a path formula, then ¬ψ is also a path formula;
• if ψ is a path formula then ∃ψ is a state formula;
• if φ1 and φ2 are state formulae and a is an action label,
then Xaφ1, φ1Uφ2 and φ1Uwφ2 are path formulae.
Definition III.12 (ACTL Semantics [19]). Let M =<
SM , s
0
M , A
I
M , A
O
M , A
H
P , RM > be an Interface Automaton.
The semantics of an ACTL formula are given by a satisfaction
relation, which is defined for M over execution fragments
α ∈ fragments(M) for path formulae ψ (noted M,α |= ψ),
and over states s ∈ SM for state formulae φ (noted M, s |= φ).
The satisfaction relation is defined inductively as follows,
where φ1, φ2 denote state formulae and ψ denotes a path
formula, and a ∈ AM :
M, s |= True always holds
M, s |= ¬φ ⇔ ¬(M, s |= φ)
M, s |= φ1 ∧ φ2 ⇔ M, s |= φ1 ∧M, s |= φ2
M, s |= ∃ψ ⇔ ∃α ∈ fragments(M) such that
αs0 = s ∧ α |= ψ
M,α |= ¬ψ ⇔ ¬(M,α |= ψ)
M,α |= Xaφ ⇔ length(α) > 1 ∧ αa0 = a∧
M,αs1 |= φ
M,α |= φ1Uφ2 ⇔ (∃0 ≤ j < length(α))(∀0 ≤ i < j)
M,αsi |= φ1 ∧M,αsj |= φ2
M,α |= φ1Uwφ2 ⇔ (M,α |= φ1Uφ2)∨
(∀0 ≤ i < length(α))M,αsi |= φ1
We will abuse notation and, given a finite set of actions A,
note XAφ as an equivalent to
∨
a∈AXaφ. Also, we can further
refine the satisfaction relation to ask whether a formula φ is
satisfied by an Interface Automaton M when under a given
scheduler σ. The satisfaction semantics are kept almost the
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same, except that whenever we need to check for fragments
in fragments(M), we must restrict them to those generated
by σ.
B. Probabilistic Automata
The previously presented definitions push us halfway to-
wards our goal of providing a suitable language for the
specification of probabilistic user environments. The proba-
bilistic semantics are introduced via a well-known reactive
probabilistic formalism, that of Segala’s Simple Probabilistic
Automata [10], [20]. As we will see, this model extends classic
LTSs by modifying the transitions so that they no longer reach
a single state, but a probabilistic distribution over a set of
destination states instead.
Definition III.13 (Segala’s Simple Probabilistic Automaton
(SPA)). A Simple Probabilistic Automaton is defined by a
tuple M =< SM , s0M , AM , RM > where
• SM is a finite set of states.
• s0M ∈ SM is a distinct initial state.
• AM is a finite set of actions.
• RM ⊆ SM×AM×D(SM ) is a transition relation, where
D(SM ) denotes the set of probabilistic distributions over
the set of states SM . Further, RM is required to be finite.
We will note RM (s) to denote the set of all transitions that
originate on state s, that is, those tuples in RM where the
first component is s. Similarly, we will note RM (s, a) to note
the set of transitions originating in s through action a. For
convenience and without loss of generality, we will assume
that for all states s ∈ SM , the transition relation is such that
RM (s) 6= ∅ [21].
In a manner similar to other automata-based behaviour
description formalisms, Simple Probabilistic Automata can be
constructed compositionally as the product of other, smaller
Simple Probabilistic Automata.
Definition III.14 (Simple Probabilistic Automata prod-
uct [10]). Let M1 =< S1, s01, A1, R1 > and M2 =<
S2, s
0
2, A2, R2 > be two Simple Probabilistic Automata. Their
product M1 ⊗M2 is another Simple Probabilistic Automaton
M =< SM1⊗M2 , s
0
M1⊗M2 , AM1⊗M2 , RM1⊗M2 >, such that
• SM1⊗M2 = (S1 × S2)
• s0M1⊗M2 = (s
0
1, s
0
2)
• AM1⊗M2 = A1 ∪A2
• given (s, t) ∈ S1⊗S2, a ∈ A1∪A2 and δ ∈ D(SM1⊗M2),
RM1⊗M2 is such that ((s, t), a, δ) ∈ RM1⊗M2 if and only
if any of the following is satisfied:
1) a ∈ A1 ∧ a /∈ A2 ∧ ∀s′ ∈ S1(∃δ1 ∈ D(S1) such that
(s, a, δ1) ∈ R1 ∧ ∀s′ ∈ S1, δ((s′, t)) = δ1(s′))
2) a ∈ A2 ∧ a /∈ A1 ∧ ∀t′ ∈ S2(∃δ2 ∈ D(S2) such that
(t, a, δ2) ∈ R2 ∧ ∀t′ ∈ S2, δ((s, t′)) = δ2(t′))
3) a ∈ A1 ∩ A2 ∧ ∃δ1 ∈ R1(s, a) ∧ ∃δ2 ∈ R2(t, a) such
that ∀s′ ∈ S1, t′ ∈ S2, δ((s′, t′)) = δ1(s′)× δ2(t′).
As was the case for Interface Automata earlier in the paper,
SPAs are composed through an asynchronous product, but
synchronising on shared actions. This distinction is made
clear when defining the transition relation for the product
SPA. Clauses 1 and 2 state that, whenever an action is not
shared by both processes, the possible distributions governing
transitions in the product are exactly those that come from
each component process. Clause 3 describes the synchronising
nature of the Simple Probabilistic Automata product. The
distributions for transitions where the action label is shared are
computed as the product of the distributions for each of the
components. Note that, when composing states from different
components, if at any of these states the shared action is not
enabled (i.e., the state does not provide an outgoing transition
through the shared action), then no distribution is present and
the product cannot be computed. In that case, the product state
does not have an outgoing transition on the shared action—it
does not synchronise.
The definitions for execution fragments and complete exe-
cutions still apply to Simple Probabilistic Automata, as we are
still interested in the possible traces of the Simple Probabilistic
Automaton.
Definition III.15 (SPAs’ execution fragments and executions).
An execution fragment of a Simple Probabilistic Automaton M
is a (possibly infinite) sequence α = s0(a1, p1)s1(a2, p2)s2 . . .
of alternating states and transitions, where these transitions
are annotated by their governing action and associated prob-
ability. Execution fragments always start with a state and, if
finite, also end with a state. Each sequence si(ai+1, pi+1)si+1
within an execution fragment of M is such that there exists a
probabilistic distribution δ such that (si, ai+1, δ) ∈ RP , and
δ(si+1) = pi+1.
Given an execution fragment α, first(α) denotes the first
state of the fragment, while tail(α) denotes the execution
fragment from its second state. tail(α) might be empty if α
is finite and consists of only one state. If α is finite, last(α)
denotes its final state.
An execution of a Simple Probabilistic Automaton M is an
execution fragment α of M such that first(α) = s0M , the initial
state of the automaton. As executions are execution fragments
themselves, they can also be finite or infinite.
As was the case for Interface Automata, we will also note
fragments(M) and fragments∗(M) to denote the set of exe-
cution fragments of M and the set of finite execution fragments
of M , respectively. Additionally, we will note execs(M) and
execs∗(M) for the set of executions and finite executions of
M . We also define length : fragments(M) → N ∪ ∞ to
be the number of states traversed by the execution fragment.
For additional convenience, we define projectors αsi , α
a
i and
αpi that return the i-th state, i-th transition label and i-th
associated probability respectively. Note that αsi is defined
from 0 through length(α) − 1, while αai and αpi are defined
from 1 through length(α) − 1. Finally, we will note α ≤ α′
to indicate that the execution fragment α is a finite prefix of
execution fragment α′. Again, suffix (α, i) is defined for every
i < length(α) and obtains the execution fragment that results
of dropping the first i states and probability-action pairs from
an execution fragment. Therefore, for an execution fragment
α = s0(a1, p1)s1(a2, p2)s2(a3, p3)s3 . . ., suffix (α, 0) = α,
suffix (α, 1) = s1(a2, p2)s2(a3, p3)s3 . . . and so on.
The notion of schedulers for resolving non-determinism
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is also preserved, but note that instead of scheduling an
action and a destination state, it schedules a distribution on
destination states instead.
Definition III.16 (Scheduler for Simple Probabilistic Au-
tomata). A scheduler σ for a Simple Probabilistic Automaton
M =< SM , s
0
M , AM , RM > (also called an adversary) is a
total function σ : execs∗(M) → AM × D(SM ), such that if
σ(α) = (a, δ) it must be that (last(α), a, δ) ∈ RM .
For ease of reading, we will note σ(α)a to refer to the
scheduled action label, and σ(α)δ to refer to the chosen
distribution. That is, if σ(α) = (a0, δ0), then σ(α)a = a0
and σ(α)δ = δ0.
It is noteworthy, however, that resolving non-determinism
via a scheduler for an SPA does not, as was the case for
Interface Automata, produce a unique execution. Rather, re-
solving non-determinism induces a fully probabilistic process,
specifically a Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC) which,
in turn induces a set of execution fragments. For more insight
on these probabilistic processes the reader may refer to [22],
[23].
This combination of a scheduler σ and an SPA M defines
a probability measure δ on the σ-algebra generated by the
cones (also called cylinder sets in the literature) of execution
fragments.
Definition III.17 (Cones and probability measure [20]).
Given a finite execution fragment α of an SPA M , the
cone of α is the set of execution fragments Cα =
α′ ∈ fragments(M) · α ≤ α′. The measure of a cone Cα
under scheduler σ is defined as
δ(Cα,M, σ) =
length(α)∏
i=1
IsSched(σ, α, i− 1, αai )× δSched(σ, α, i− 1)(αsi )
where δSched : Sched(M)× fragments∗(M)×N→ D(SM ),
and IsSched : Sched(M)× fragments ∗ (M)×N×AM →
{0, 1} are such that δSched(σ, α, n) = σ(α0 . . . αn)δ and
IsSched(σ, α, n, a) =
{
1 if σ(α0 . . . αn)a = a
0 otherwise
In other words, δSched obtains the distribution corresponding
to the next scheduled transition, while IsSched checks whether
in fact a is the next scheduled action.
Cone measure as defined in Definition III.17 can easily be
extended for sets of non-overlapping cones. Given a SPA M , a
scheduler σ, and a set Γ of finite execution fragments such that
for every αi, αj ∈ Γ neither is a prefix of the other, we can
define the measure of the set Γ (noted δ(Γ,M, σ)) as follows:
δ(Γ,M, σ) =
∑
α∈Γ
δ(Cα,M, σ)
The notion of cones is essential for the definition of the σ-
algebra underlying SPAs, since it gives us a way to measure
sets of traces. As we will see later, this concept will have a
strong relation with the logics we will employ to reason about
SPA behaviour.
10 2
a
b
c 0.50
0.50
d
 σ1(0, α) = aσ1(1, α) = b
σ1(2, α) = d σ2(0, α) = aσ2(1, α) = c
σ2(2, α) = d
Fig. 4: A Simple Probabilistic Automaton and two unfair
schedulers. σ2 is probabilistically fair
Leveraging on the previous definitions, we can characterise
the set of execution fragments generated by a scheduler σ on
an SPA M .
Definition III.18 (Simple Probabilistic Automaton scheduled
fragments). Let M be a Simple Probabilistic Automaton,
and σ a scheduler for M . The set of scheduled execution
fragments of M through σ is the set of execution frag-
ments fragments(M,σ) ⊆ fragments(M) such that α ∈
fragments(M,σ) ⇔ (∀α′ ∈ fragments∗(M) · α′ ≤ α ⇒
δ(Cα′ ,M, σ) > 0).
In other words, fragments(M,σ) is the set of the execution
fragments of SPA M that may be generated probabilistically
given a scheduler. Each scheduler for an SPA generates a
(possibly infinite) set of executions and execution fragments,
instead of a single execution as was the case for automata that
do not exhibit probabilities. Therefore, schedulers alone are
not enough to exercise complete control over the executions
of an SPA, as probabilities also have an influence on pos-
sible behaviour. In particular, this implies that the notion of
scheduler fairness needs to be adjusted. Consider for example
the case of the SPA depicted in Figure 4, and two possible
schedulers σ1 and σ2 that behave roughly as described beside
the automaton. In both cases, a nonfair execution is possible
– 0a1b1b1 . . . b1b1b1 . . . in the case of scheduler σ1, and
0a1c0a1c0a1 . . . c0a1c0a1 . . . in the case of scheduler σ2.
Under the previous definition, neither of these schedulers are
themselves fair. However, note that the probability of the
nonfair executions under σ2 is actually zero, while those under
σ1 have nonzero probability. This important distinction leads
to the definition of probabilistically fair schedulers. Once
again, this definition has been put forth previously in [15],
[16], [17].
Definition III.19 (Probabilistically fair schedulers). A sched-
uler σ is probabilistically fair for an SPA M if it either is
strictly fair, or else the measure of the subset of nonfair ex-
ecutions within its scheduled fragments set fragments(M,σ)
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(that is, the measure of the cones that describe the set) is zero.
In other words, a probabilistically fair scheduler generates
fair execution fragments almost surely, while they almost
never produce unfair execution fragments. For the remainder
of this paper, when we refer to fair schedulers for SPAs, we
will be implicitly referring to probabilistically fair ones, unless
specifically noted.
1) Simulations for probabilistic automata: The notion of
simulations [24] is useful to compare the behaviours of
automata, and is a step forward to establishing equivalence
between them. In the context of probabilistic automata the con-
cept of simulations has also been studied [7]. In this work we
will leverage on the particular notion of probabilistic branching
simulations [20]. We will employ these simulations to show
that our approach to composability preserves behaviour, in
the form of establishing these kind of simulations between
different automata.
Before we can define probabilistic branching simulations
properly, we need to understand the basic blocks with which
they are built. Probabilistic branching simulations must show
that the probabilistic information is simulated between dif-
ferent automata. The main mechanism through which this
is achieved is by showing that a probability distribution on
the simulated system can be embedded into a probability
distribution over the system that simulates it.
Definition III.20 (Distribution embedding [10]). Let R ⊆ S×
T be a relation between two sets S and T ; and let δS ∈ D(S)
and δT ∈ D(T ) be two distributions on each of those sets. We
say δS and δT are in relation vR, noted δS vR δT if there
exists a weight function w : S × T → [0, 1] such that
1) for each s ∈ S, ∑t∈T w(s, t) = δS(s);
2) for each t ∈ T , ∑s∈S w(s, t) = δT (t);
3) for each (s, t) ∈ S × T , w(s, t) > 0 =⇒ sRt.
The notion of distribution embedding bears a close rela-
tionship to embedding a probabilistic transition of one system
into a combination of several transitions on the other, and vice
versa. The notion of combined steps captures this relationship.
Definition III.21 (Combined step [10]). Let M be an SPA
and s ∈ SM an arbitrary state. Let δC ∈ D(AM × SM ). We
say (s, δC) is a combined step of M if there exists a weight
function w : RM (s)→ R such that for each action a in AM
the following hold:
•
∑
(t,a,δ)∈RM (s) w((t, a, δ)) = 1; and
• for every s′ ∈ SM it holds that δC(a, s′) =∑
(t,a,δ)∈RM w(t, a, δ)δ(s
′).
In other words, a combined step of M at state s is a convex
combination of the transitions allowed by M at state s. We
will note s
a,p−→C s′ every time that there exists a combined
step C = (s, δC) such that δC(a, s′) = p.
A related notion is that of weak combined steps. A weak
combined step is essentially a product of many combined steps
where at most one of them is via a non-internal action, while
the rest are internal.
0
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(a) Original transition distributions
0
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0.32
0.2
0.3
0.0375
0.0375
0.105
(b) Combining internal distributions
Fig. 5: An internal combined step
Definition III.22 (Internal combined step [10]). Let M be
an SPA, s ∈ SM and δIC ∈ D(SM ). (s, δIC) is an internal
combined step if either
1) δIC(s) = 1; or
2) there exists a combined step (s, δC) such that for every
(a, t) ∈ AM × SM such that δC(a, t) > 0 it holds that
a) a ∈ AHM ;
b) there exists an internal combined step (t, δ(s,a,t)) noted
step(s, a, t); and
c) for every state s′ ∈ SM , δIC(s′) =∑
(a,t)∈AM×SM δC(a, t) ∗ δ(s,a,t)(s′); where δ(s,a,t)
is the distribution given by the combined step
step(s, a, t).
Essentially, an internal combined step is a combination of
subsequent combined steps where each combined step is such
that it assigns non-zero probabilities only to internal actions.
Figure 5 shows an example of an internal combined step. In
this case, all actions are hidden so no labels on transitions
are necessary. Different transition distributions are told apart
by the arc between the transitions. The combined transition
depicted is obtained through an embedded distribution. This
embedded distribution is the result of combining the distribu-
tions from state 0 with a factor of 0.5 on each distribution; and
from state 1 using factors 0.3 (distribution shown on left) and
0.7 (distribution shown on right). In this case the combined
step “skips” state 1.
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Fig. 6: A weak combined step on action a
There is a combination of combined steps and internal
combined steps that is of important interest, which is the case
when a state can be reached by any combination of exactly
one action in AIM ∪ AOM and countably many interleavings
of actions in AHM in between. We shall denote these as weak
combined steps.
Definition III.23 (Weak combined step [10]). Let M be an
SPA, s ∈ SM and a ∈ (AIM ∪ AOM ). (s, a, δC) is a weak
combined step if and only if there exists a combined step
(s, δ′C) such that every time that δC(action, state) > 0 the
following hold:
1) action = a ∨ action ∈ AHM ; and
2) if action = a then either δ′C(state) > 0 or else there ex-
ists an internal combined step denoted step(s, a, state) =
(state, δ′IC);
3) otherwise, if action ∈ AHM , there exists a weak combined
step denoted step(s, action, state) = (state, a, δC);
4) and finally, for every state t ∈ SM it holds that δC(t) =∑
(action,state)∈AM⊗SM δ
′
C(state) ∗ δs,action,state(t),
where δs,action,state is the distribution of
step(s, action, state).
Figure 6a shows an example of distributions that can be
combined as a weak combined step. Inside the arc correspond-
ing to a distribution we note the triggering action. a is an action
that is presumably shared with an external environment, while
h is an internal action to the component we are modelling
in this case. Figure 6b shows the resulting weak combined
step. In this case, we obtained this step by combining the
first two transitions (originating from state 0) with factors of
0.5 each; on state 3 we use factors 0.3 and 0.7. In this case,
the combination is far more complex, as hidden actions may
appear before or after the action a, and even multiple times.
However, it can easily be seen that the resulting step is much
more simpler as well.
Definition III.24 (Probabilistic branching simulation
(PBS) [10]). Given two Simple Probabilistic Automata M1
and M2, a probabilistic branching simulation is a relation
R ⊆ SM1 × SM2 such that
1) the initial state of M1 is related throughR with the initial
state of M2;
2) for each s1Rs2 and each possible transition (s1, a, δ1) ∈
R1 then:
a) if a ∈ AM2 , there exists a weak combined step
(s2, a, δ2) such that the distribution δ1 can be embed-
ded into δ2 through R, that is, δ1 vR δ2.
b) if a /∈ AM2 , there exists an internal combined step
(s2, δ2) such that δ1 vR δ2.
3) every time that s1Rs2, it must be that if s1 ai−→ for a set
of actions ai ∈ AM1 , then s2 a=⇒ as well for at least one
of these actions ai; where s
a−→ denotes that there is a
transition from s with action a; and s a=⇒ denotes that
s can weakly transition to some other state on action
a. That is, it either has a enabled, or there is a path
of internal transitions to a state where a is enabled. In
other words, whenever s2 weakly enables some actions,
at least one of them must be weakly enabled in s1. This
establishes a liveness condition1.
Whenever there exists such a simulation relation R between
M1 and M2 we will say that M2 simulates M1, and note it
M1 vR M2 (or succinctly M1 vM2 if we do not care about
the particular relation R).
Property III.1 (Reflexivity and Transitivity [10]). Probabilis-
tic branching simulations are both reflexive and transitive.
2) Logics for property description: In order to express and
analyse properties over probabilistic models such as SPAs,
these automata are coupled with modal logics whose formulae
express said properties. For the specific case of probabilistic
models, the temporal logic pCTL* [25] has been introduced
as an extension of the well known temporal logic CTL*.
Essentially, pCTL* replaces path quantifiers present in CTL*
for probabilistic quantification bounds on the related path
formulae.
pCTL* Syntax and Semantics. pCTL* formulae are built
from state and path formulae, just as CTL*. Let AP be a finite
set of atomic propositions. If φ stands for a state formula, and
ψ for a path formula, then pCTL* formulae are built as follows
φ→ true | a ∈ AP | ¬φ |φ ∧ φ |P∼pψ
ψ → Xφ |φUφ |φU≤kφ
1In [10] liveness is required on every action, although it is mentioned that
it can be relaxed in the way we state here.
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In the above, ∼∈ {<,≤,=,≥, >} and p ∈ R, p ∈ [0, 1]. Given
an SPA Q and a mapping of states to atomic propositions
V : SQ → 2AP defining the subset of atomic propositions
that are valid for each state, we can define the satisfaction of
pCTL* formulae by a state s ∈ SQ, a scheduler σ ∈ Sched(Q)
and an execution fragment α ∈ fragments(Q) as follows
s, σ |= true ⇔ true
s, σ |= a ⇔ a ∈ V (s)
s, σ |= ¬φ ⇔ ¬(s, σ |= φ)
s, σ |= φ1 ∧ φ2 ⇔ (s, σ |= φ1) ∧ (s, σ |= φ2)
s, σ |= P∼pψ ⇔
∑
α∈ψsat δ(Cα, σ,Q) ∼ p
where α ∈ ψsat iff α, σ |= ψ and
for every other α′ ∈ ψsat neither
α ≤ α′ nor α′ ≤ α.
α, σ |= Xφ ⇔ αs1, σ |= φ
α, σ |= φ1U≤kφ2 ⇔ ∃0 ≤ i ≤ k · αsi , σ |= φ2∧
∀0 ≤ j < i · αsj , σ |= φ1
α, σ |= φ1Uφ2 ⇔ ∃0 ≤ k · α, σ |= φ1U≤kφ2
For convenience, we will note that a SPA Q and scheduler σ
satisfy a formula (noted Q, σ |= φ) if the initial state s0Q is such
that s0Q, σ |= φ. We can also generalise the satisfaction relation
to set of schedulers. Given a set of schedulers Σ ⊆ Sched(Q),
we say Q satisfies φ under Σ, noted Q,Σ |= φ if for every
σ ∈ Sigma, Q, σ |= φ. Further, whenever Σ = Sched(Q) we
simply note Q |= φ.
It is interesting to note that satisfaction verification of a
pCTL* formula can be reduced to a reachability problem
coupled with an optimization problem if more than one
scheduler is possible [25]. Informally, given a path formula φ,
a typical pCTL* state formula takes the form of a restricted
classic CTL* state formula, but where path quantifiers have
been replaced by the probabilistic operator P∼a. Thus, a state
formula P≤aφ (resp. P≥aφ), is true at a given state of the
system if its possible evolutions from that state satisfy the
formula φ with probability at most (resp. at least) a.
Note that whether a formula is satisfied or not by a SPA
depends heavily on schedulers. Under two different schedulers,
the same pCTL* formula may be satisfiable or not. This plays
a critical role especially in the case of probabilistic operator
formulae (that is P∼pψ) as two different schedulers may assign
distinct probabilities. In general, the scheduler is unknown
when evaluating the satisfaction of a formula. Therefore, it is
more interesting to know if a formula holds for any possible
scheduler. In that case, for a probabilistic formula ψ, there will
exist a scheduler σψmin that induces a minimum probability
on the formula being satisfied; and another one σψmax (not
necessarily distinct) that induces a maximum probability. Then,
we will usually employ a different form of the probabilistic
operator to query whether the minimum or maximum proba-
bilities satisfy our requirements. We will usually replace the
operator P∼p by two other operators Pmin∼p and P
max
∼p , which
are evaluated globally for every scheduler. Satisfaction of these
operators will be defined as follows:
s |= Pmin∼p ψ ⇔ s, σψmin |= P∼pψ
s |= Pmax∼p ψ ⇔ s, σψmax |= P∼pψ
It is important to note that there is a close relationship
between pCTL* satisfaction and the notion of cones defined
in Definition III.17. We can see from the semantics definition
of pCTL* that s, σ |= P∼pψ if the measure of the set of
traces that satisfy ψ holds the relation ∼ p. We have already
established that cones induce a σ-algebra (in particular, a
measure). The set of traces that satisfy ψ can be characterised
by a (possibly infinite, but numerable) set of disjoint cones,
based on the prefixes of the traces. Therefore, the set of traces
that satisfy ψ has a definite measure induced by the cones that
characterise it.
Finally, note that in the context of this work we will focus
on a restriction of pCTL*, namely its weak fragment, which
we denote as WpCTL*. A WpCTL* formula is restricted in
the sense that the X and U≤p operators are prohibited. Such
a restriction is reasonable when the aim of the approach is to
allow further refinement by modelling internal computation of
components. The next and bounded until operators, which we
choose to avoid, distinguish models based on these internal
computations. However, from the point of view of an external
observers, such internal computation should not be discernible.
3) Simulations and property preservations: There is a close
relationship between automata that can be shown to be in a
probabilistic branching simulation, and the sets of WpCTL*
formulae that they satisfy. However, since an automata that
simulates another will probably have more behaviour than
the simulated one, it is necessary to take into account some
precautions regarding fairness if we wish to study these sets
of properties. As we will see, this idea has a close relationship
to that of probabilistically fair schedulers III.19.
Definition III.25 (Probabilistically convergent automata [10]).
A Simple Probabilistic Automaton M is probabilistically con-
vergent under a set of schedulers Sch if for every state s ∈ SM
and σ ∈ Sch , the probability of diverging (that is, performing
infinitely many internal actions and no input or output actions)
from state s is 0.
Definition III.26 (Induced subgraph, (Bottom) strongly con-
nected component). Given a digraph G = (V,E) where V
is the set of vertices and E the set of directed edges, the
subgraph induced by V0 ⊆ V is the graph G0 = (V0, E0)
such that E0 ⊆ E includes all edges between vertices in V0,
and no other edges.
An induced subgraph G0 = (V0, E0) of G is a strongly
connected component (SCC) of G if every vertex in V0 is
reachable from every other vertex in V0 through edges in E0.
An SCC G0 = (V0, E0) of G is a bottom SCC (BSCC) if
no vertex from V0 can reach a vertex in V \V0 through edges
in E.
Proposition III.1 (Convergence of SPAs). Let M be a Simple
Probabilistic Automaton such that its underlying graph has no
BSCC whose edges contain only internal actions. Let Sch a
set of probabilistically fair schedulers for M . Then, it holds
that M is probabilistically convergent under Sch .
Proof. The proof is immediate from the definition of prob-
abilistically fair schedulers. The only way for an infinite
sequence of internal actions to have a measure larger than zero
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is that there is only a finite number of probabilistic choices
with probability less than 1. For having such a situation
be possible, there should be only a finite number of non-
deterministic choices made in favour of input/output actions
instead of internal actions. However, such a choice would be
in direct violation of probabilistically fair schedulers, therefore
no probabilistically fair scheduler may result in a divergent
automaton.
Note that the requirement of M having no purely internal
BSCCs is reasonable and stems from the fact that they are
trivially divergent, and largely uninteresting from a modelling
point of view, since they would model only unobservable
behaviour. In the remainder of the paper assume that the SPAs
under study comply with this requirement.
Finally, we recall a central theorem from [20] regarding
probabilistic branching simulations and convergent SPAs.
Theorem III.1 (PBSs preserve WpCTL* [10]). Let M1 and
M2 be two SPAs and such that M1 vM2. Let φ = P≥pψ be
a WpCTL* formula. Then, it holds that M2,Σ2 |= φ implies
that M1,Σ1 |= φ as well, where the formula satisfaction is
considered only under the subsets Σ1 ⊆ Sched(M1) and
Σ2 ⊆ Sched(M2) of fair schedulers .
In other words, Theorem III.1 states that, under the condi-
tions described, if the minimum probability of M1 satisfying
ψ is p, then the minimum probability of M2 satisfying ψ
is at least as much. Note that the theorem also applies to
maximum probabilities, since the minimum probability pmin
of satisfying a given formula is equal to 1−p¬max where p¬max
is the maximum probability of satisfying the negation of that
same formula. In the remainder of this paper, we will focus
on fair schedulers, so we will note M |= φ to implicitly refer
to satisfaction under the subset of fair schedulers Σ (that is
M,Σ |= φ).
This notion of probabilistic branching simulations and prop-
erty preservation is central, as we will show that our approach
is such that the composition establishes a probabilistic branch-
ing simulation between the components and the composite
system, and therefore preserves WpCTL* behaviour. This will
be stated in Theorem III.1.
IV. PROBABILISTIC INTERFACE AUTOMATA
In this section we present our new modelling formalism
designed to overcome the shortcomings other probabilistic
modelling formalisms have, as was discussed in Section II.
A. Definitions, relations with IA and SPA
Leveraging on the definitions presented in previous sections,
we can attain our aim of merging the notion of SPAs with that
of Interface Automata. As a way to attain this objective, we
define Probabilistic Interface Automata based on SPAs.
Definition IV.1 (Probabilistic Interface Automata). A Prob-
abilistic Interface Automaton (PIA) is a tuple of the form
M =< SM , s
0
M , A
I
M , A
O
M , A
H
M , RM > where the sets A
I
M ,
AOM and A
H
M are mutually disjoint, and such that defining
AM = A
I
M ∪ AOM ∪ AHM yields a Simple Probabilistic
Automaton MSPA =< SM , s0M , AM , RM >.
Therefore, a Probabilistic Interface Automaton is an SPA
that shares the input, output and hidden action semantics from
Interface Automata. Note that since a Probabilistic Interface
Automaton must induce an SPA, then RM ⊆ SM × AM ×
D(SM ). Note also that a Probabilistic Interface Automaton A
has an underlying Interface Automata, noted A ↓ and defined
as follows:
Definition IV.2 (Underlying IA). Given a Probabilistic In-
terface Automaton E, we define its underlying Interface
Automaton as the classic Interface Automaton E ↓=<
SE↓, s0E↓, AE↓, RE↓ > such that SE↓ = SE , s
0
E↓ = s
0
E ,
AE↓ = AE and for all s, s′ ∈ SE↓, a ∈ AE↓, (s, a, s′) ∈ RE↓
if and only if there exists a distribution δ ∈ RE(s, a) such that
δ(s′) > 0.
Simply put, the underlying Interface Automaton of a Proba-
bilistic Interface Automaton is a non-deterministic automaton
with the same state and edge structure, where all probabilities
have been forgotten and replaced by non-deterministic transi-
tions, leaving all other information unchanged. Conversely, it
is also worth noting that a classic Interface Automata can be
embedded in a Probabilistic Interface Automata by restricting
RM to Dirac distributions. This definition is akin to that of
underlying graph of Markov chains [20], but this definition
makes explicit the fact that the obtained graph is an Interface
Automaton.
The notion of underlying Interface Automaton turns out to
be useful for a natural way to define Probabilistic Interface
Automata composability.
1) Composability and product:
Definition IV.3 (Composability). Given P and Q two Prob-
abilistic Interface Automata, we will say that P and Q are
composable if their underlying Interface Automata P ↓ and
Q ↓ are themselves composable (see Definition III.3).
The concepts of execution fragments and schedulers still
apply to Probabilistic Interface Automata. Since these au-
tomata can be directly embedded into an SPA, we will refer
to the SPA definitions for these concepts while working with
PIAs. Probabilistic Interface Automata product, however, does
express some differences regarding the composition of the
transition relation.
Definition IV.4 (Product). Given P and Q two composable
Probabilistic Interface Automata, their product P ⊗ Q is
defined by the Probabilistic Interface Automaton:
P ⊗Q =< SP⊗Q, s0P⊗Q, AIP⊗Q, AOP⊗Q, AHP⊗Q, RP⊗Q >
where SP⊗Q ,s0P⊗Q, A
I
P⊗Q, A
O
P⊗Q and A
H
P⊗Q are defined in
the same way as Interface Automata composition. Its transition
relation RP⊗Q ⊆ SP⊗Q × AP⊗Q × D(SP⊗Q) however, is
constructed in the same way as it was constructed for SPAs
(Definition III.14).
Note that we are overloading the operator ⊗ to refer to all of
IA, SPA and PIA composition. The specific meaning in each
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Fig. 7: Probabilistic Interface Automata (partial) product. Only
the composite state 1A is shown.
case, however, can be easily understood from the context in
which we use the operator. Refer to Figure 7 for an example of
two-state composition, where a? denotes a is an input action
for the automaton, and a! denotes it is an output. Unannotated
actions are internal. Recall that we would like the notion of
Probabilistic Interface Automata to exceed a syntactic notion
and actually have an interesting semantic bearing, as otherwise
its usefulness would be drastically reduced. We will see to this
objective in Theorem IV.1.
Property IV.1 (Commutativity). As is the case for Interface
Automata, composition of PIAs is commutative, that is A ⊗
B = B ⊗A.
Property IV.2 (Composition and ↓ operator). The proba-
bilistic composition operator and the underlying Interface
Automata operator are distributable over one another. That
is, if P and Q are two Probabilistic Interface Automata, then
(P ⊗Q) ↓= P ↓ ⊗ Q ↓.
Property IV.3 (Composition preserves refinement). Let A, B,
C be PIAs and R a PBS such that A vR B. Also, let A⊗C be
legal as well as B⊗C. Then, it holds that A⊗C vR B⊗C.
2) Illegal states and valid environments: The notions of
illegal states and valid environments can also be extended
for Probabilistic Interface Automata. In essence, they share
the same definition, except for an important difference in the
illegal states concept. As we discussed in Section II, the orig-
inal criteria for defining illegal states in the case of Interface
Automata is too stringent, as it requires immediate enabledness
of output actions in the component to be composed with.
In the following definition, we will make use of ACTL
formulae over the underlying Interface Automaton of a given
Probabilistic Interface Automaton P .
Definition IV.5 (Illegal states). Given two composable Prob-
abilistic Interface Automata P and Q, their product’s illegal
states are defined by the set IllegalProbIA(P,Q) ⊆ SP × SQ.
For any s ∈ SP , t ∈ SQ, (s, t) ∈ IllegalProbIA(P,Q) if it is
the case that either
i) for any action a ∈ AOP ∩ Shared(P,Q) enabled
in s (respectively, actions b ∈ AOQ ∩ Shared(P,Q)
enabled in state t) the ACTL formula ∀(Xa) ∨
(XAQ\Shared(P,Q)True)U(XaTrue) does not hold for
Q ↓ at state t under fair schedulers (respectively ∀(Xb)∨
(XAP \Shared(P,Q)True)U(XbTrue) does not hold on
P ↓ at state s); or
ii) s is such that its only enabled actions on P are a subset
As of AIP ∩ Shared(P,Q) (respectively, enabled actions
at t on Q are a subset At of AIQ∩Shared(P,Q)) and the
ACTL formula ∀(XAQ\Shared(P,Q)True)U(XAsTrue)
does not hold on Q ↓ at state t (respectively the formula
∀(XAP \Shared(P,Q)True)U(XAtTrue) does not hold on
P at state s) when being evaluated, restricting evaluation
only to fair schedulers.
Note that the semantics of the U operator above is that of
a strong until. The difference between weak until (Uw) and
strong until is subtle and merits a reminder: an execution α
satisfies the path formula ψUwφ (that is, α |= ψUwψ) if there
exists an index i such that αsi |= ψ and ∀0 ≤ j < i · αsj |= φ;
or alternatively αsk |= φ for every k ≥ 0. The strong until is
more stringent in the sense that it does not allow the second
alternative, and it needs the step αsi such that α
s
i |= ψ to exist.
In other words, the strong until demands the formula ψ to be
true at some point, while weak until does not, as long as φ is
never violated.
The illegal state definition for Probabilistic Interface Au-
tomata relaxes that of Interface Automata, so that synchroni-
sation does not need to be available at each state, but may
be finitely delayed, under certain conditions. Intuitively, the
first clause (i) enforces the claim that states will only be
legal if they allow an output action to be taken immediately;
or else, if the current state is momentarily blocking it, it is
such that every possible continuation of the trace from that
state involves only internal actions of the blocking component
until it allows the blocked behaviour to happen. However,
it still is required that the synchronisation be carried out,
regardless of any internal actions the delaying component
takes. It must be noted that this future synchronisation delayed
by a component cannot depend on action requirements by
its counterpart. That is, a component may delay synchro-
nisation only through the execution of internal actions, and
every possible fair continuation of such execution fragments
must eventually synchronise. Such restrictions are essential
to further probabilistic analysis, because failure to eventually
accept such behaviours would result in missing behaviour
from the environment, along with its probability. Note that we
refer to fair executions in the sense of probabilistic fairness.
In other words the probability distributions that govern the
transitions may allow for an indefinite delay of the required
synchronization, but the probability of selecting this delay
indefinitely should be zero (i.e., such a situation should almost
never arise).
Clause (ii) in turn, describes that states that only allow for
shared input actions are such that they must eventually always
receive one of these input actions in order to advance. These
are states that need to receive an input in order to advance
(because the states themselves do not generate outputs and
do not perform internal actions), and must be guaranteed to
eventually receive one of these inputs and cannot be kept
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stuck forever. This second restriction essentially imposes an
advancing condition on quiescent states of the components. On
the one hand, this forces the counterpart component to actually
have one of those actions as an output to be processed by the
blocked component. On the other hand, fairness conditions are
vital to ensure, additionally to the fact that the action must be
available, that again the action is taken at some point in the
future and is never indefinitely delayed.
These restrictions allow us to relax the stringent immediate
blocking semantics, and let us model components’ internal be-
haviour in a way that doesn’t interfere with the synchronising
semantics. Also, note that these conditions are not necessarily
exclusive to Probabilistic Interface Automata. They can be
used to relax the Interface Automata illegal states condition
as well.
There is a price to pay, however, in the complexity of
checking for legality. In the case of Interface Automata,
this check was straightforward since it depends only on the
states being composed. Legality checks of PIA may require
i) the whole composition to be built, and ii) checking ACTL
formulae satisfaction. We expand on this in Section VI.
B. PIAs and property preservation
In the case of Probabilistic Interface Automata, WpCTL* is
a viable logic for property observation, since we can leverage
on their underlying SPA structure and the scheduler definition
(recall Definition III.7). The main contribution of this paper
is to convey the notion that the product of two interfacing
probabilistic models is not merely a syntactic convenience,
but that it does maintain a semantic relationship between
the individual models, their composition, and their observable
properties. The following theorem and its corollary see to this
objective.
Theorem IV.1 (WpCTL* property preservation). Let A and B
be two composable Probabilistic Interface Automata such that
their product A⊗B is legal (that is, it contains no reachable
illegal states). Let φA be a WpCTL* property such that φA
is expressed only in terms of the alphabet of actions in A.
Then, if A |= φA under fair schedulers, then it holds that
A⊗B |= φA under fair schedulers as well.
Informally, the theorem provides a validation for the com-
positional view of the component-composite model relation,
as properties formulated early in the validation process do not
lose their meaning once the components are integrated into
a whole composite model. Intuitively, this is true, since the
composition does not add new behaviour and neither does it
prohibit allowed behaviour by the environment.
We delay for a moment proving the theorem and present a
useful corollary regarding the extreme probabilities (minimum
and maximum) of satisfaction of a given WpCTL* property.
Corollary IV.1 (Maximum and minimum scheduler probabil-
ity). Let A and B be defined as in Theorem IV.1. Let ψA be
a WpCTL* formula and σmaxA be a fair scheduler for A such
that A, σmaxA |= P=pψA, where p ∈ [0, 1]. Further, let every
other fair scheduler σA be such that A, σA |= P≤pψA. In other
words, σmaxA yields the maximum probability of satisfying ψA
on A.
Similarly, let σmaxA⊗B be the scheduler that yields the
maximum probability q of satisfying ψA on A ⊗ B. Then, it
holds that q ≤ p.
This same corollary applies analogously to the minimum
probabilities of satisfying ψA.
Proof. Suppose that it is not the case, that is q > p, or
equivalently q = p + r with r > 0. Recall from earlier
on the paper that if σmaxA yields the maximum probability
of satisfying ψA on A, then it also provides the minimum
probability of satisfying ¬ψA on A, and that it is equal to
1 − p. Similarly, σmaxA⊗B yields the minimum probability of
satisfying ¬ψA on A⊗B, with a value of 1− q.
Since σmaxA yields the minimum probability 1 − p of
satisfying ¬ψA on A, then A |= P≥1−p¬ψA. Because of
Theorem IV.1, it must be then that A⊗B |= P≥1−p¬ψA. Yet
the scheduler σmaxA⊗B is such that it satisfies ψA with probability
1− p− r < 1− p on A⊗B. Contradiction.
We can now go back to the proof of Theorem IV.1.
Proof. Recall Theorem III.1 that states that for two SPAs M1
and M2, and a WpCTL* formula φ it holds that if M1 vM2,
then M2 |= φ =⇒ M1 |= φ. Since in our setting A, B and
A⊗B are PIAs, they are also SPAs. If we were to show that
there exists a probabilistic branching simulation R such that
A⊗B vR A, the theorem would be proved as a consequence
of Theorem III.1.
We will show that R indeed exists by construction. We
defineR ⊆ SA⊗B×SA such that (s, t)Rr if and only if s = r.
We informally recall the four conditions of PBSs definition
(see Definition III.24) and show they are satisfied by R and
we will prove each formally.
First, we check that the initial state of A ⊗ B is related
through R with the initial state of A. The initial state of A⊗B
is (sA0 , s
B
0 ), the product of the initial states of A (s
A
0 ) and B
(sB0 ). By definition of R, (sA0 , sB0 )RsA0 .
Second, we check the simulation conditions on internal
actions of A ⊗ B and those shared with A. Now take an
arbitrary reachable state (s, t) ∈ SA⊗B . By definition of R
it holds that (s, t)Rs. Consider the possible steps originating
on (s, t) at A⊗B, that is RA⊗B((s, t)) ⊆ AA⊗B×D(SA⊗B).
Let (a, δ) be an arbitrary transition on this set.
a) Proving for an action a invisible to A: If a ∈
AA⊗B \ AA, then a is an action invisible to A (internal to
A⊗B). In this case we need to see that there exists an internal
combined step (s, δIC) for A, such that δ vR δIC . Define
δIC = Dirac(s), that is, δIC(s) = 1 and 0 everywhere else.
To prove δ v δIC , we refer to Definition III.20. We need to
show the existence of a weight function w : (SA×SB)×SA →
[0, 1] such that
1) ∀r ∈ SA,
∑
(x,y)∈SA×SB w((x, y), r) = δIC(r);
2) ∀(x, y) ∈ SA × SB ,
∑
r∈SA w((x, y), r) = δ(x, y); and
3) w((x, y), r) > 0⇒ (x, y)Rr.
We define the weight function w as follows:
w((x, y), r) =
{
δ(x, y) if x = r
0 otherwise
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We prove each condition on w individually. First, let r ∈
SA. We compute
∑
(x,y)∈SA×SB w((x, y), r).∑
(x,y)∈SA×SB w((x, y), r) =
=
∑
y∈SB w((r, y), r) as w is defined as 0 otherwise
=
∑
y∈SB δ(r, y)
Now, recall that δ is a distribution arising from a transition
on an action invisible to A. Therefore if the originating state
was (s, t), only states of the form (s, ti) will have nonzero
probability for δ. So, if r 6= S, ∑y∈SB δ(r, y) = 0 =
δIC(r) as δIC was 0 everywhere but s. If r = s, then∑
y∈SB δ(r, y) =
∑
y∈SB δ(r, y) which sums over the whole
support set of δ, so equals to 1, which in turn is δIC(s).
Conversely, take an arbitrary (x, y) ∈ SA × SB . Now,∑
r∈SA w((x, y), r) = w((x, y), x) as w is zero otherwise.
And w((x, y), x) = δ(x, y) by definition.
Finally, it is easy to see that if w((x, y), r) > 0 it must be
that r = x. By definition of R, (x, y)Rx, so the final point is
proven.
b) Proving for a shared action a: In this case, we need to
show the existence of a weak combined step (s, a, δWC) on A.
Action a is obviously enabled on s as otherwise a would not
synchronise and a would not be enabled on (s, t) either. Since
a is a shared action, the distribution δ on A ⊗ B must have
arisen from the product of a distribution δA on a transition
from A, and a distribution δB on B. That is, for any (x, y) ∈
SA × SB , δ((x, y)) = δA(x)× δB(y).
In this case, we define δWC = δA, while w is defined in
the same way as it was defined before. The conditions on w
are proven in the same way as in the previous case.
c) Proving the liveness condition on simulations: Finally,
in order for R to be a probabilistic branching simulation, we
need to show that whenever (s, t)Rs and s enables a set of
actions AA(s), then (s, t) weakly enables a set of actions
AA⊗B(s, t) with at least one action in common. The proof
is a direct consequence of the fact that A ⊗ B has no illegal
states. Assume s o−→ s′ for at least one output action o.
Because of condition i) on illegal states, every internal-action
path on B must eventually enable action o to be illegal-state-
free. Therefore, o is weakly enabled on A⊗B.
Alternatively, suppose that s i=⇒ only for internal actions
i. In this case, because of condition ii) on illegal states, B
must weakly enable at least one of them, so enabledness on
A⊗B is also guaranteed.
As an additional note, it is worth noting that composi-
tion, while preserving WpCTL* properties, may not actually
preserve the exact event probabilities for a given property.
For example, assume environment E satisfies the property
P≤0.75ψ. Recalling the formula satisfaction definition, this
means that E satisfies ψ with probability at most 0.75 under
the control of any scheduler. There may, or may not, be an
actual scheduler that, when controlling E actually witness
probability 0.75 for formula ψ. The interesting issue is that
even if there is such a scheduler, the existence of a scheduler
for E⊗S witnessing probability 0.75 for ψ is not guaranteed;
in fact every scheduler for E ⊗ S may witness an inferior
probability.
This distinction, however, is only important from a more
formal point of view. In practice, if the approach is being used
in a software engineering context, this distinction is not as im-
portant. For example, an engineer may be interested in proving
that a given component has at most a 0.05 chance of failing.
That is, the engineer poses the formula P≤0.05failure, where
failure is a formula capturing the conditions under which
the component actually fails. The engineer then validates this
formula over the component and finds it to be true. Then, it is
guaranteed that the probability of this same component failing
over the whole composition is at most 0.05. Further, suppose
that in fact the engineer observes that the probability of failure
of the isolated component is exactly 0.05. However, it may
very well be that, because of behaviour restriction imposed
by the composition, the exact failing probability drops to, for
example, 0.03 or even zero in the composition. In any case,
the reliability objective posed by the engineer, although it does
not preserve the exact probability, is only reinforced by the
composition. The failing probability never increases because
of the composition, it can only decrease (and in fact, can only
decrease down to the minimum probability of failure of the
isolated component, and no further).
V. CASE STUDY
In order to illustrate our approach, we analyse quantitatively
the behaviour of an existing software system. This system
is not probabilistic in nature, however this setting is not a
limitation for our approach, as we can understand it as a
probabilistic model comprised only of Dirac distributions.
However, we do have a probabilistic model of the envi-
ronment with which this system interacts. We then set out to
analyse the whole system specification in a modular way. That
is, we will analyse first the behaviour of each component (the
software system and its environment) in isolation. After this,
we will study the system composition, and we will compare
the obtained results.
In this case study, we analyse the impact of variations of the
expected probabilistic behaviour of this environment, which
is described using a Probabilistic Interface Automata. These
environmental variations are then composed with the non-
deterministic model of the software, and we produce bounds
on the probability of environment-specific and system-specific
properties holding. In each case, we verify the composability
of the system/environment ensemble, and analyse and vali-
date the property preservation characteristics of Probabilistic
Interface Automata.
The software system we analyse is an extension of the
case study presented in [26], which was further refined in [8].
In this paper, we further refine the models; in particular we
relax the restrictions that were previously present regarding
the immediate need for synchronisation, and allow for it to be
delayed. This refinement preserves the observable behaviour
of the original system, but the refinement is more complex
as it models internal behaviour of the system. Of course, our
approach could also be applied to the original system, although
the analyses and findings would not be as interesting in that
case.
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Fig. 8: The TeleAssistance Software.
The software under analysis is the TeleAssistance (TA)
system; a web-based application providing remote assistance
to patients that, for any reason, need to remain at their homes
and need constant monitoring. In its most basic interaction,
the patient commences operation via a startAssistance
command. This puts TA in an infinite loop accepting any of
the following requests:
• stopMsg, signaling the user wishes to cancel TA service
for now.
• vitalParamsMsg. This signal allows the user to send
varied body readings via a supplied device. The patient’s
health parameters are analysed by the application server
which, if necessary, may then suggest a course of action.
The system may decide that a change in the patient’s
medication is needed, and communicates this decision via
either the changeDrug or changeDose commands. If
a successful adjustment is made, the patient is notified via
the notifyPA message (with no details regarding the
kind of adjustment made). If any anomalies are detected
during the analysis, a First-Aid Squad (FAS) is requested
and sent. In the case of a FAS being sent, the patient is
informed via the attendToPA message.
• pButtonMsg allows the patient to activate a panic
signal, if at any moment she begins to feel sick and cannot
cope. This signal triggers an alarm in the TA service. A
successful processing of the alarm results in a FAS being
sent to the patient’s home.
We have augmented the simplified model presented in [26]
in two ways in order to introduce richer software-environment
interactions. First, by specifying that for emergency reasons
the panic button may be pushed at any operational state of the
software, even if waiting for other results. Second, by refining
the feedback provided by the software so that the patient is
also told if no medication adjustment is needed. We depict
an abstract model of the TA software in Figure 8. Note that
the model is as an Interface Automaton, which is a particular
case of the Probabilistic Interface Automata introduced in this
paper. As is customary, output actions are appended with ‘!’,
and input actions are appended with ‘?’, while internal actions
are left with no annotations.
The TA software exhibits a critical failure. this failure is
reached by the triggering of the failedAlarm event. This
happens if an alarm has been raised but it failed to be acknowl-
edged or properly handled, thus not calling and sending the
FAS. In this implementation, such an error (state 9) is reached
if the user presses the panic button once the software has
started analysing vital parameters’ data. This event sequence
was not properly foreseen by the implementation team. Rely-
ing on the software’s model only, we can easily see that such
a state is reachable. However, actual probability of reaching
said state is highly dependent on both the environment’s
behaviour and timing races regarding the interaction between
both the environment and the system. We now show how to
model the probabilistic behaviour of the environment using
Probabilistic Interface Automata, and how this resulting model
and the theory presented in previous sections allow meaningful
quantification of the probability of critical failures based on
the modelled probabilistic assumptions of the environment.
A. Modelling the Environment
In Figure 9 we depict a first attempt at modelling the
probabilistic behaviour of the environment (in this case, the
patient) of the TA software. The patient, when waiting for a
vital parameters analysis response, probabilistically chooses
to wait patiently or press the panic button. Also, it reflects a
certain degree of anxiety in the patient’s behaviour, since it
behaves quite differently depending on whether the software
determines to adjust her medication or not. If the medication is
not adjusted, the patient reverts to its usual behaviour, however,
if the medication is indeed adjusted, she becomes more prone
to pressing the panic button.
Although seemingly a reasonable model of this environ-
ment, this is not the case. It is straightforward to see
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Fig. 9: An initial environment for the TA system
that Figure 9 is a Probabilistic Interface Automaton (see
Definition IV.1) and that it is composable (see Defini-
tion III.3) with the TA system model (Figure 8). How-
ever, Figure 9 is not a valid environment (see Defini-
tion III.6). The composite state consisting of state 9 in the
TeleAssistance system model; and state 9 of the environ-
ment is an illegal pair (see Definition IV.5) that is reach-
able in the product (see Definition IV.4) of both models
via the trace: (0s, 0e) startAssistant (1s, 1e) choice
(1s, 2e) vitalParamsMsg (5s, 5e) analyseData (7s, 5e)
choice (7s, 8e) pButtonMsg (8s, 5e) choice (8s, 9e)
failedAlarm (9s, 9e). We have suffixed each state with ei-
ther e or s to make clear whether we refer to the environmental
or system state respectively.
The fact that (9s, 9e) is an illegal state highlights that the
environment is making incorrect assumptions on the behaviour
of the system and renders the probabilistic environment be-
haviour modelled meaningless. For instance, analysing the be-
haviour of the probabilistic environment it is easy to conclude
that the probability of sending a vitalParamsMsg to the
system as the next message if being at state 9e is at most
0.7, and at least 0.205 (the upper bound is obtained if the
noChange/attendToPA transition is followed, while the
lower bound is the result of the sum of the possible outcomes
of taking the notifyPA transition). However, the same
analysis on the product results in a probability inconsistent
with the analysis on the environment alone. The inconsistency
is that while, for the patient, the lower bound for the property
was 0.205, the lower bound was decreased to zero (rather
than increased) when composed with the system. The increase
of the lower bound is due to the fact that the environment’s
behaviour specified in the environment’s state 9e is restricted
when the system is in its own state 9s, hence the environment
probabilistic contribution that outgoing transitions from 9e
made to the lower bound of the property are no longer possible.
However, this particular environment fails to makes a provision
in modelling the possibility of such a restriction.
In summary, if the analyses performed to validate the
probabilistic behaviour of the environment are not valid once
the environment is composed with the software, then the model
of the environment has a limited, if any, potential for sound
analysis. The definition of legal environment, which the model
in Figure 9 does not satisfy, is aimed to guarantee sound
analysis.
We can produce a legal environment for the TA by slightly
modifying the current one. For example, a possible solution is
to add timeout transitions from states 9e and 11e, modelling
that the environment can give up waiting for the software
response concluding that it has probably crashed in some
way. That is to say, the previous model of the environment
was establishing very strong assumptions on the system; the
environment required the system to always generate an input
at these states. This assumption, which turns out to be wrong,
results in an illegal environment as it generates illegal states
in the composition – see condition (ii) in Definition IV.5.
The property discussed with the initial probabilistic envi-
ronment now evaluates to the interval [0, 0.7] in this legal
environment, and this is consistent with the evaluation of the
property when composing the legal environment with the soft-
ware. In fact, due to Theorem IV.1 we know that any property
that has been used to validate the probabilistic behaviour in
this legal environment will be preserved in its composition
with the software. Asserting the validity of the conditions for
legal environments essentially entails verification of several
liveness properties. For this case study, however, we have
chosen to check the legality of the environment directly by
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hand, given that the size of the model allows for such a
manual analysis. Larger models would, of course, require an
automated procedure for such validation.
B. Quantitative Analysis of the TA Software System
Since we have a legal environment for the TA software,
we can now analyse quantitatively the behaviour of the TA
software system by checking the probability of system prop-
erties holding when the TA software is composed with the
legal probabilistic environment. The properties we considered
for our quantitative analysis were taken from [26]. To perform
the analysis we use the model checker PRISM [11], a well-
known probabilistic verification tool.
Consider the property that states that the FAS is always sent
to the patient location when the alarm has been raised. Clearly,
the TA software does not satisfy this property (see transition
from 8 to 9 in the system model). However, it is interesting to
quantify the probability of such error under the assumption of
a particular probabilistic behaviour of the environment. To do
this we first computed the product of the Interface Automaton
for the TA software and the Probabilistic Interface Automaton
modelling the environment and then using PRISM we quantify
the occurrence of the error which can be characterised by
the CTL formula error = (trueU TA.state = 9). Recall that,
because of non-determinism in the TA software, we will not
obtain a single probability as the event measure, but rather an
interval of where the probability lies.
In the product of the TA software and its legal environ-
ment, the lower and upper bounds for reaching error =
(trueU TA.state = 9) can be characterised as P error1min =
maxx{P≥x(trueU TA.state = 9)} and respectively P error1max =
minx{P≤x(trueU TA.state = 9)}. Computing these values in
PRISM yields P error1min = 0 and P
error1
max ∼ 0.9108. Note that
the lower bound does not convey much information because
of the highly non-deterministic nature of the TA software
model. There is always a non-deterministic possibility that the
error is never reached. In other words, there is a scheduler
that always avoids the error. If information were available on
the probabilistic behaviour of the internal choices of the TA
software (e.g. reliability information) then the lower bound for
this property could be non-zero.
The (rather high) value of P error1max is sensitive to the
probabilistic behaviour of the environment, namely the four
probabilistic transitions labelled with choice (states 1, 5, 6
and 10). Varying the probabilities on these transitions helps
understand the impact of the probabilistic environment on the
system behaviour. Table I summarises a few analyses where
these probabilities have varied and how these variations affect
the final value of P error1max .
The table shows that the value of P error1max decreases notice-
ably when the probability of exiting the assistance system (that
is, transitioning from state 1 to 4 on choice) is increased (see
row 5). This is sensible as the property being checked has an
unbounded until operator, meaning that we are interested in
the occurrence of errors no matter how long the system runs.
Hence, the longer the system runs, the more likely it is to fail;
and so the more likely the environment chooses to stop the
software (transition 1 to 4) the less likely the probability of
error, bringing P error1max down.
Another interesting analysis, taken from [26] is to under-
stand the probability of the following scenario occurring: “if
a changeDrug or changeDose occurs, the next message
received by the TA generates an alarm which fails”. Rather
than using a pCTL formula, we modelled this property by
means of an observer Interface Automaton that flags this sce-
nario as an error. Table I also summarises the results obtained
for this error measure, P error2max for the same distributions as
before, showing the relationship between distributions, and the
differences with P error1max .
Summarising, in this section we have shown how Proba-
bilistic Interface Automata supports carrying out quantitative
analysis of models in a compositional way. The notion of
legal environment and its related theorems are crucial, as they
constrain the acceptable models of the probabilistic behaviour
of the environment to those that ensure that analysis performed
to validate the environment’s probabilistic behaviour is sound
and preserved when analysing the composite system.
VI. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
In this work we have dealt with the problem of enriching
behaviour models in the shape of automata with probabilistic
information. Our work is based on the Interface Automata [9]
formalism, which introduces an optimistic approach to com-
position by making explicit assumptions over its environment.
These assumptions allow for a notion of refinement, given by
weaker input assumptions and stronger output guarantees.
In this work we have taken the action segregation semantics
of Interface Automata as a starting point for introducing
probabilities into non-deterministic systems. One of the main
results presented by Interface Automata is the refinement
relation between different versions of the same component.
In that sense, a more concrete version of the component
(e.g., an implementation) refines a more abstract one (e.g.,
a specification). Our work also benefits from this refinement
notion. In our case, however, we require that this refinement
also takes into account the probabilistic semantics of the
component. The concept of probabilistic branching simulations
(Definition III.24) encompasses that of Interface Automata
refinement and, additionally, it also establishes a refinement of
probabilistic behaviour. In other words, if two Probabilistic In-
terface Automata A1 and A2 are in a refinement relation given
by a probabilistic branching simulation (that is, A1 v A2),
then it is also the case that their underlying Interface Automata
(Definition IV.2) A1 ↓ and A2 ↓ are also in a refinement
relation as defined by Interface Automata (that is, A2 ↓ refines
A1 ↓).
Additionally, regarding the notion of compatibility and
composability of Interface Automata, we have taken only
the initial definitions from [9]. In that work, the notion of
compatibility is also extended to pairs of components, in the
sense that a pair (A,B) components are compatible if there
exists a third Interface Automaton (the environment) that is
composable with the product A ⊗ B. In other words, they
establish that A and B are compatible is there exists an
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Run R(1,choice) R(5,choice) R(6,choice) R(10,choice) P error1max P
error2
max
1 (2 7→ 0.7),(3 7→ 0.25),(4 7→ 0.05) (8 7→ 0.7),(9 7→ 0.3) (2 7→ 0.15),(3 7→ 0.85) (1 7→ 0.1),(6 7→ 0.9) 0.9108 0.1435
2 (2 7→ 0.7),(3 7→ 0.25),(4 7→ 0.05) (8 7→ 0.7),(9 7→ 0.3) (2 7→ 0.99),(3 7→ 0.01) (1 7→ 0.1),(6 7→ 0.9) 0.9304 0.6727
3 (2 7→ 0.7),(3 7→ 0.25),(4 7→ 0.05) (8 7→ 0.7),(9 7→ 0.3) (2 7→ 0.15),(3 7→ 0.85) (1 7→ 0.95),(6 7→ 0.05) 0.9076 0.4707
4 (2 7→ 0.7),(3 7→ 0.25),(4 7→ 0.05) (8 7→ 0.2),(9 7→ 0.8) (2 7→ 0.15),(3 7→ 0.85) (1 7→ 0.1),(6 7→ 0.9) 0.7584 0.41
5 (2 7→ 0.15),(3 7→ 0.2),(4 7→ 0.65) (8 7→ 0.7),(9 7→ 0.3) (2 7→ 0.15),(3 7→ 0.85) (1 7→ 0.1),(6 7→ 0.9) 0.1441 0.105
6 (2 7→ 0.15),(3 7→ 0.2),(4 7→ 0.65) (8 7→ 0.7),(9 7→ 0.3) (2 7→ 0.15),(3 7→ 0.85) (1 7→ 0.95),(6 7→ 0.05) 0.1393 0.105
7 (2 7→ 0.15),(3 7→ 0.2),(4 7→ 0.65) (8 7→ 0.2),(9 7→ 0.8) (2 7→ 0.99),(3 7→ 0.01) (1 7→ 0.95),(6 7→ 0.05) 0.0458 0.0384
TABLE I: Varying P error1max and P
error2
max for different distributions
environment that can link their behaviours together. We find
this introduction of a third component unnecessary, hence we
define compatibility in terms of the original two automata.
The idea of the third environmental component is significant
if the aim of the work is, for example, to synthesise these
environments. This synthesis is not the focus of the present
work, although it is a subject of interest for future research.
Finally, it is important to note that the notion of weak
probabilistic simulations subsumes that of alternating sim-
ulations in Interface Automata. Further, in this paper we
have extended these simulations with weak semantics, which
further extends the applicability of Interface Automata to an
engineering process where model refinement with internal
actions is desirable as a means to both converge to the design
of a software component, and provide several views of the
same component at different layers of abstraction.
Apart from these concepts inherited from Interface Au-
tomata, the focus of our work is the mechanism through
which probabilistic information is added to non-deterministic
models, in a way that it guarantees a sensible composition
semantics. In this sense, it is worth pointing out that in the
last few decades researchers have paid attention to the concept
and consequences of operational profiles in system reliability
specification and analysis [27], [2], [28], [29], [30].
One way to enrich models with probabilistic information
is to analyse and quantify the influence that components exert
over one another as well, and that can be observed as emergent
behaviour on the composition. For example [31], [26] have
proposed using a sample space of runs obtained from an ex-
isting similar system as the source of probabilistic behaviour.
Then, using an algorithm that summarises this information,
a non-probabilistic automata model of the composite system
and environment is annotated with the obtained probabilities.
The aim of this work is to be able to account for complex
quantifiable interactions, in which the history of execution
affects the probabilistic behaviour of an interacting component.
Unlike our work, this approach is not suitable to building a
system in a modular fashion, as the annotation is performed
over the whole model. This yields a verification artefact that
is a single model containing all the relevant probabilistic
transition information, both pertaining to the environment
and to the system. Also, Markov models such as these are
purely probabilistic, which may not allow us to fully model
concurrent systems’ non-deterministic behaviour.
Although operationally intuitive, annotation approaches,
such as the ones mentioned, lack a declarative characterisation
of the resulting annotated composite model and its relation
to the source of probabilities. In addition, and more impor-
tantly, they lack a notion of property preservation regarding
the source of the annotations. This is crucial as, whatever
the source of probabilities for the annotation is, this source
must have been validated according to some criteria. If the
annotation algorithm does not preserve such criteria, then little
can be said about the validity of analysis performed on the
probabilistically annotated composite model.
Another problem we tackle with our approach is that of
mixing non-deterministic and probabilistic information on a
single formalism. The problems arising from trying to mix this
information in a meaningful way are not new, and approaches
to either achieving or avoiding this mixed specification have
been studied. For example, generative models [4] aim to
avoid mixing non-determinism and probabilities. They do
so by disallowing non-determinism to be present on transi-
tions. However, an asynchronous parallel composition (à la
CSP [32]) induces such non-determinism and must be dealt
with. Works such as [6] advance in this direction resorting to
redistributing probabilities when finding synchronising actions
with no matching counterpart. It is unclear if this approach
is suitable when the probabilities reflect system-environment
interaction—the environment (in the most usual case, a user)
may not actually redistribute probabilities on allowed actions
when the desired one is not allowed. Regarding purely reactive
models [5] the reader can refer to Sect.II to understand
limitations regarding our goals.
A compromise can be met by choosing to model outputs in a
generative way, while inputs are modelled reactively [33], [3].
This approach however, has several limitations. First, it does
not allow non-determinism on output actions, as they must be
strictly generative. Second, it also requires input-enabledness
in a way similar to Input/Output automata. In [33] it is noted
that input-enabledness can be skirted, but doing so imposes the
restriction that models may not have any input-input or input-
output races. On the one hand this limits the expressibility of
models that can be represented, and on the other hand such
an approach ends up modelling the scheduling of actions in
an explicit way.
It must be noted that an important precedent to this work
is that of probabilistic Input/Output automata [3]. This model
enriches classic Input/Output automata [12] with probabilities,
establishing a hybrid between the generative and reactive
models, since output actions are modelled in a generative way
while input actions are modelled reactively. The approach in
itself is interesting, but the probabilistic Input/Output automata
model has some characteristics we consider problematic. In
the first place, it inherits from Input/Output automata the
notion of input enabledness, that is, every component au-
tomaton, at every state, must allow every possible input as
a transition. As we previously argued, this is not a realistic
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restriction in most cases, since systems are usually designed
with some concept of the environment in mind, and thus it
is reasonable that they restrict some inputs at certain points
of execution. Another characteristic aspect of probabilistic
Input/Output automata is that they introduce a real-valued
parameter to each state in each component automaton. This
parameter, an additional random variable as it happens, models
a delay on each automaton state. The rationale for this delay
is the need to somehow resolve conflicting races, since at
some points when composing it would be feasible for more
than one component to synchronise its actions. This delay
then establishes an order in which the automata advance,
that is, the automata in which the state delay is the least
will advance first. This notion of resolving races between
competing transitions is also present in our model, as in other
proposed models [7]. However, this choice is represented by an
external entity, the scheduler. The scheduler has no dependence
on the model itself, and the model behaves independently of
the scheduler. Additionally, the notion of a scheduler models
an unknown within the system under analysis. That is, it
models a behaviour that cannot be explicitly quantified; the
Input/Output automata notion of delay defeats this modelling
objective. In that sense, we argue that the idea of a built-
in scheduler as a composite aspect of the system model–
be it probabilistic or not–is undesirable, as we aim to a
separation of concerns. Finally, a behaviour composability
result is presented for probabilistic Input/Output automata,
though it is different to the one we present in this paper.
Probabilistic Input/Output automata behaviour preservation
stems from that of the original non-probabilistic Input/Output
automata. This result states that every execution trace in
the composite automata, when restricted to the actions of
each component automaton, is an execution trace of said
component automaton. However, this result leverages heavily
on the embedded scheduler concept depicted above. Our
result does not establish such a stringent relation, since we
establish that system-environment composition does refine the
specified behaviour, but observed probabilistic behaviour in
the environment is still preserved, thus allowing for early
elicitation of interesting properties.
Apart from modelling system behaviour by means of syn-
chronising automata, there have also been advances in quanti-
tative contract-based modelling or, in a similar fashion, quan-
titative assume-guarantee reasoning. The work by Delahaye
et al. [34] presents a contract-based approach that shares
many similarities with the work we present in this paper. In
particular, both works aim at presenting a formalism that can
reason about isolated components in the context of a composite
systems. There exist two key differences between the approach
presented here and that of [34]. First and foremost, the object
of study in [34] are contracts which are represented by sets of
traces while our work deals with automata-like description of
behaviour. This makes the approach in [34] unable to reason
about branching non-deterministic behaviour. The use of traces
allows them to define composition and conjunction between
systems (by composing or conjuncting their contracts), while
also allowing for a notion of refinement between systems (that
is, contracts that refine other contracts that otherwise allow
less or require more). In turn, we do provide the notion of
composition, but where conjunction does not have a direct
analogue. Our choice of automata as models allows for ex-
plicit representation of non-deterministic choices and permits
a larger degree of expressibility than that of the contracts
of Delahaye et al. In that sense, our approach is closer to
modelling formalisms such as Segala’s Probabilistic Automata
and Markov Decision Processes than those of contracts. As
an additional difference, the work in [34] analyses contracts
in isolation, and results in a lower bound for the probability
of satisfying the contract that results of the composition of
these contracts. Our approach is also intended for the isolated
analysis of components; however we introduce a notion of
preservation of WpCTL* properties rather than bounds.
There is also work on assume-guarantee verification of
safety properties, which have some similarity to our own. The
work of Kwiatkowska et al. [35] is noteworthy. In that work the
authors model probabilistic systems through automata much
like those presented here, and perform an assume-guarantee
analysis on properties. This approach, however, limits itself
to safety properties which are represented via deterministic
automata. Other work [36] also presents an assume-guarantee
approach where the object of study are Interactive Markov
Chains [37]. These models, however, establish a segregation
between probabilistic and labelled actions that does not allow
for modelling synchronisation on actions triggered by different
probability distributions.
The notion of refinement in automata-based formalisms is
related to that of simulation (and bisimulation). Being that
our PIAs are a restricted case of Segala’s Simple Probabilistic
Automata [20], the notion of (bi)simulation is well-defined.
However, bisimulation can be too strict, and not an effective
notion, in the presence of components with internal computa-
tion that needs to be abstracted away. In regards to this ques-
tion, the notion of weak bisimulation [24] has been employed
effectively in the context of non-probabilistic systems. Such a
notion of weak bisimulation has been recognised, although it
is problematic for probabilistic systems [38], [39]. We do not
go into detail in these aspects, however some interesting work
includes [40] where the authors present a weak bisimulation
notion along with a decision procedure, albeit focused on fully
probabilistic systems alone. Also, [10] introduces a notion of
weak bisimulation for systems exhibiting non-determinism,
where the bisimulation proposed includes the potential gen-
eration of infinite probabilistic distributions representing all
possible intermediate internal steps. Philippou et al. [41] and
Cattani [42] attack this problem by restricting distributions to
a certain class.
The second main result presented in this paper regards the
synchronising conditions for Interface Automata. We found
the synchronising conditions to be too strict regarding the
immediate necessity for synchronisation. However, software
systems that need to perform several internal actions before
allowing inputs from its environment are commonplace. Such
systems cannot be easily modelled with Interface Automata
without abstracting away such internal behaviour, eliminating
the possibility to observe this potentially interesting behaviour.
In this paper, we have relaxed the need for immediate synchro-
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Fig. 10: Deferred blocking of an input action a
nisation in these cases, while requiring a notion of fairness on
the schedulers allowed for the composite system. This decision
allows for further analysis. Although the fairness conditions
imposed are not esoteric or overly restrictive, it may be the
case that they can be refined and further relaxed. Preliminary
analysis has shown that the fairness requirement over some
states may be relaxed in some cases–for example, loops made
up purely of internal actions, that can be ignored if not allowed
to happen–but a generalisation and proper characterisation
remain as future work.
It must be noted that our approach calls for a composition
operator that performs extensive checks to allow for this
delayed synchronisation. If these checks took an inordinate
amount of time or memory to be performed, the approach
would suffer from applicability. Fortunately this is not the
case. Automatically checking for Probabilistic Interface Au-
tomata illegal states during composition is similar to checking
for illegal states in classic Interface Automata composition.
Namely, at every point in the composition process it must
be checked that the conditions for illegal states do not hold.
For the case of Interface Automata, this is a completely local
verification step, as we only need to validate that input actions
are not blocked at any step. The complexity is thus polynomial
in the size of the composite system, and it can be performed
on-the-fly as the procedure for building the composite system
is executed.
For the case of Probabilistic Interface Automata, the ver-
ification step is more involved, due to the fact that deferred
synchronisation is allowed. At some points, it may be possible
to check legality locally. For example, picture the case of a
component that does not allow a certain input action a to be
taken, nor it allows any internal actions of its own. This means
that this action a is not enabled at this point, and will never
be enabled through internal actions. Therefore, composing this
component with another that intends to take its own output
action a would be illegal. In this case, it would be easy to
check illegality locally, on-the-fly.
However, in general, that may not be the case. Consider the
example depicted in Figure 10. Here we see a partial model
of a component (dotted lines denote continuing executions).
In this case, the situation is similar to that discussed before,
as this component is still blocking input a at state 0 but,
opposed to the situation before, it allows several of its internal
actions (int) to be executed. In this case, it is not possible to
check illegality locally; executions continuing from the grey
states may potentially block action a at some point in the
future, depending on the non-deterministic choices taken. It
is necessary to verify the ACTL conditions of illegal states
for all paths that sprout from taking one of these internal
actions. In the worst case, this may require an ACTL check for
every single state of the composition as it is being constructed.
However, ACTL checking is still polynomial on the size of
the system where it is being checked (which of course is
smaller than the whole composite system), and the ACTL
formula to check is of a constant size. Therefore, although
illegal state checking for Probabilistic Interface Automata is
harder than checking for Interface Automata, the complexity
is still polynomial on the size of the composite system.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Quantitative model checking and analysis are promising
techniques that complement Yes/No automatic analyses of
behaviour. This approach naturally raises several formal and
practical challenges. As a first challenge, it is important that
these probabilities be introduced in a component-wise fashion.
This is desirable because of two reasons. The first one is
that it is often difficult to establish the quantitative behaviour
of the system at large. In trying to do so, there is a risk
that the engineer cannot properly validate that the introduced
probabilities are result of a single component behaviour, and
therefore these probabilities would lose their meaning. The
second reason for component-wise modelling is that it is
much easier for an engineer to reason individually about one
component and then integrate the resulting model with other
component models that were developed independently.
A second challenge is that introducing probabilities should
not interfere with the behaviour that was described previously,
that is, it should not preclude behaviour that was modelled and
validated previously in an independent manner. In other words,
the introduction of probabilities should be performed in such
a way that already validated component-wise properties are
preserved over the composite model.
The key to these challenges is a careful treatment of control-
lability of actions, non-determinism, and fairness assumptions
over the behaviour of composite systems. We present Proba-
bilistic Interface Automata as a suitable formalism satisfying
these requirements and show that they are compositional, that
is, there is a notion of property preservation between the com-
ponents and the composite system. As a way to validate our
claims, we present a case study along with our results obtained
by the use of the technique. Although the case study presented
leverages on manually generated environments, research on the
generation of useful and sound environments is the focus of
future and ongoing work.
Deeper understanding of fairness assumptions also merits
further work. In the particular case of this paper, we have
shown that a notion of strong fairness, relaxed for proba-
bilistic behaviour, is sufficient to ensure compositionality of
Probabilistic Interface Automata. However, it remains to be
seen if such assumptions are completely necessary, or if they
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could be weakened. If so, further analysis is necessary for
understanding under which conditions these assumptions may
be weakened and what their impact is on modelling different
environmental domains.
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